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Abstract
Almost all real assets trade in decentralized markets, where trading frictions could
inhibit the efficiency of asset allocations and depress asset prices. In this paper, I use
data on commercial aircraft markets to empirically investigate whether trading frictions
vary with the size of the asset market. Intuitively, it is more difficult to sell assets that
have a thin market. As a result, firms find it optimal to hold on longer to assets with
a thinner market in case their profitability rises in the future. Thus, when markets for
firms’ assets are thin, firms’ average productivity and capacity utilization are lower, and
the dispersions of productivity and of capacity utilization are higher. In turn, prices
of assets with a thin market are, on average, lower and have a higher dispersion, since
prices depend on firms’ productivity and capacity utilization.
The empirical analysis confirms that trading frictions vary with the size of the market,
as aircraft with a thinner market have: 1) lower turnover; 2) lower capacity utilization;
3) higher dispersion of utilization levels; 4) lower mean prices; and 5) higher dispersion
of transaction prices.
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1 Introduction
Many assets trade in decentralized markets. Classic examples are financial assets, such as
bonds and derivatives, and real assets, such as real estate and capital equipment. The fun-
damental characteristics of a decentralized market are that traders must incur costs to search
for trading partners and that, once a buyer and a seller meet, they must bargain to determine
a price. The goal of this paper is to investigate how trading frictions vary with the thick-
ness of the asset market, analyzing patterns of asset allocations and prices in the market for
commercial aircraft.1
Some decentralized markets are very buoyant. The paragon is the secondary market for
U.S. Treasury securities, where the daily volume of trade was about $125 billion in 1994
(Fleming, 1997). Although secondary markets for real assets are less bustling, some are still
rather active. For example, among consumer durables, the number of used cars traded every
year in the U.S. is more than twice as large as the number of new purchases (Stolyarov, 2002);
among capital equipment, the number of transactions for used commercial aircraft is about
three times the number of purchases of new aircraft (Gavazza, 2009).
In most decentralized markets, each asset trades several times during its “lifetime.” There-
fore, parties’ trading decisions incorporate not only the expected cash flow that the asset gen-
erates, but also any cost that traders will incur in selling it at a later date.2 When the number
of potential users of the asset is small, trading in decentralized markets generates substantial
monetary and opportunity costs, as the search process to find buyers able to generate the
highest cash-flow from the asset may be difficult. For example, most capital equipment is
specialized by industry, so used assets typically have greater value inside the industry than
outside (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Even within an industry, however, one firm’s assets may
not be a perfect match for another firm’s.
In this paper, I employ a tractable analytical framework to focus on the effects of market
thickness on asset allocations and asset prices. I use the model to motivate several empirical
tests for the presence of thick-market effects, and I perform these tests by combining several
datasets on markets for one class of real assets—commercial aircraft. The theoretical frame-
work adapts Diamond’s (1982) seminal paper to asset markets, in a similar way to that of a
growing literature—starting with Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005)—that applies search-
and-bargaining models to financial markets. The model’s key economic mechanism is that,
under a standard assumption on the meeting rate between buyers and sellers,3 the trading
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Thus, as the mass of assets increases, the
1In the course of the paper, I use the expressions market thickness/thinness and size of the market in-
terchangeably. In the empirical analysis, I will measure market thickness/size of the market of each aircraft
type in two similar ways: 1) the stock of the aircraft of that type; and 2) the number of operators using that
aircraft type.
2House and Ozdenoren (2008) construct a model of durable goods in which consumers’ demand is influenced
by resale concerns. In equilibrium, resale concerns can be so strong that individuals choose to purchase a good
that they like less than other available goods.
3The precise assumption is that buyers and sellers meet according to a Poisson process with a fixed arrival
rate. This is quite standard in the literature. See Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005 and 2007), Vayanos
and Wang (2007), and Weill (2008) for a sample of recent papers adopting this assumption.
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flow of meetings increases more than proportionally. Increasing returns in search capture the
notion that trading costs decrease with trading volume and that assets with a thicker market
are more “liquid”—i.e., easier to trade.4,5 Moreover, increasing returns precisely fit the char-
acteristics of aircraft markets as reported by industry experts and market participants. For
example, according to Lehman Brothers (1998), “[A]ircraft with a large number in current
use across a wide array of users will obviously be easier to resell or re-lease than aircraft with
limited production and usage.”
Through the trading technology just described, the size of the asset market has important
implications for allocations and prices. Trading frictions reduce the value of searching for
a trading partner, thereby affecting owners’ decision over whether or not to sell when their
idiosyncratic profitability drops. When assets have a thin market, firms on each side of the
market do not search exhaustively for the best matches (Ramey and Shapiro, 2001), and it is
optimal even for quite inefficient firms to keep them. Instead, when assets have a thick market,
the matching between buyers and sellers becomes easier, and assets transfer immediately to
the highest-profitability firms. Thus, assets with a thicker market trade more frequently. In
turn, these trading decisions determine the cross-sectional distribution of active firms. In
particular, the lower bound of firms’ productivity is higher when asset markets are thicker.
Hence, the average profitability of firms is higher, and, at the same time, the dispersion of
their profitability is lower in thicker asset markets. In summary, assets with a thick market
are more efficiently allocated than assets with a thin market.
The effects of trading frictions on asset allocations transmits to asset prices. In particular,
transaction prices are determined through negotiations that depend on sellers’ and buyers’
ability to generate cash-flow from the asset and on alternatives to immediate trade.6 Hence,
on average, prices are higher when assets have a thicker market since firms’ profitabilities
are higher. Moreover, the value of searching for an additional counterparty disciplines price
dispersion. Since it is easier to find a counterparty in a thicker market, the cross-sectional
dispersion of transaction prices is lower. Thus, the level and the dispersion of asset prices
reflect how active the market is and how efficiently assets are allocated.
In summary, the theoretical framework generates five testable implications for assets with a
larger market: 1) they trade more frequently; 2) they have higher average capacity utilizations;
3) they have lower dispersion of capacity utilization levels; 4) they fetch higher average prices;
and 5) they have lower dispersion of transaction prices.
In the empirical section, I combine four distinct datasets concerning the aircraft market
to empirically investigate the above implications. The data allow me to construct two related
4See Lippmann and McCall (1986) for a similar relationship between market thickness and liquidity.
5The literature on liquidity in financial markets generally uses bid-ask spreads, or market depth, or float
as measures of liquidity. In markets for corporate assets, however, bid-ask spreads and market depth cannot
be measured, and the variable that is conceptually closer to the float is probably the total stock of aircraft of
a given type—i.e., market thickness. Starting with Demsetz (1968), several papers (Garbade and Silber, 1976;
Tanner and Kochin, 1971 are early examples. Amihud, Mendelson and Uno, 1999 is a recent example) have
empirically investigated the relationship between bid-ask spreads and the float or the number of shareholders
(for stocks), or issue size (for bonds). All these papers consistently find lower bid-ask spreads for stocks with
larger float or a larger number of shareholders, and for bonds with a larger issue size.
6Pulvino (1998) empirically establishes that sellers in worse financial conditions sell assets at a lower price.
In Section 4.7.2, I discuss in more detail the relationship between this paper and Pulvino (1998).
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measures of the market size: 1) the stock of aircraft of a given type in a given year; and 2)
the number of operators using a given aircraft type in a given year. The empirical analysis
is heavily guided by the theory, but is also more flexible than the model. In particular, the
richness of the data allows me to control for a large number of factors that may plague the
identification of the effect of market thickness in the empirical analysis, addressing two main
challenges: 1) heterogeneity of carriers that may generate selection into different aircraft types,
and 2) endogeneity of the measures of market size. More precisely, I control for unobservable
differences across models and even unobservable differences between vintages of the same
model to identify the effect of market thickness on aircraft prices. In addition, to identify the
effect of market thickness on asset allocations, I can also control for unobservable differences
between aircraft of the same vintage and model, as well as for unobservable characteristics of
the carriers that may induce selection into different aircraft types.
Nonetheless, the use of the quantity-based measures of market size described above could
still create a few potential challenges to identifying the effects of market thickness. The reason
is that both measures of market thickness are stock variables that include the flows of new
aircraft/operators, and time-varying unobservables that affect aircraft utilization and prices
may be correlated with these new flows and, thus, with the measures of market thickness. For
example, unobservable demand shock, such as an increase in the demand for flights, could
simultaneously increase aircraft demand, production of new units and entry of new carriers
on one side, and capacity utilization and/or prices on the other side. To address these issues,
the empirical analysis exploits the panel dimension of the data to use Arellano and Bond’s
techniques, along with a rich set of instruments that shift the endogenous variable for supply-
side reasons. In particular, several papers have empirically documented the importance of
learning-by-doing in aircraft production: The costs of producing an aircraft decreases with
previous cumulative production (Wright, 1936; Asher, 1956; Alchian, 1963; Argote and Epple,
1990; Benkard, 2000). Thus, everything else equal, the supply of new units in a given year t
is higher if cumulative production of the same type of aircraft was higher in previous years.
Moreover, the richness of the data also allows me to use other supply-side instruments that
should not be correlated with year-to-year short-run variations in demand between different
types: the number of years since the aircraft type was first released by its manufacturer; the
stock of aircraft of the same type produced more than 25 years ago; the (deflated) price of alu-
minum and its lags; and the average number of days of strike per worker in the manufacturing
sector in the country of the aircraft manufacturer and its lags.
The empirical analysis confirms all theoretical predictions.7 Moreover, the analysis reveals
that the magnitudes of the effects are rather large. A ten-percent increase in the stock of
aircraft of a given type implies: 1) a 1.9-percent increase in the hazard of trading the aircraft;
2) a 1.9-percent increase in the average capacity utilization; 3) a 2.2-percent decrease in
the absolute percentage deviation of utilizations from the mean utilization; 4) a 2.7-percent
increase in the average price; and 5) a 1.5-percent decrease in the absolute percentage deviation
of transaction prices from the mean price.
7Section 4.3 provides direct evidence on trading delays by investigating delays and idle times between
leases.
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This paper is one of the first to investigate the role of the microstructure of the market for
capital assets. The paper employs a unified framework to study the effects of trading frictions
in real asset markets, and it provides quantitative evidence on the importance of these frictions
for several economic outcomes. The empirical findings suggest that, even within a well-defined
asset class such as aircraft, capital is moderately specialized, and market thinness generates
frictions that are a large impediment to the efficient reallocation of capital.8 These conclusions
have several potential implications. First, the notion of asset-market thinness is similar to the
notion of asset specificity, and an extensive large literature has shown the implications of asset
specificity for economic institutions (Williamson, 1975), organization of firms (Hart, 1995),
financial structure of firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), and even macroeconomic fluctuations
(Caballero and Hammour, 1998). However, quantification of specificity has remained scarce.
Second, an important literature has investigated the role of costly capital reversibility on
investment behavior (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), and this paper provides estimates of
these costs arising due to market thinness. Third, the paper complements a series of recent
papers that study the process of capital reallocation and quantify frictions in such a process
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1998, 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Schlingemann et al., 2002;
and Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006).
The paper further contributes to the literature on productivity dispersion. Capacity uti-
lization is closely related to firm productivity. (Indeed, the model shows that more-productive
firms choose a higher level of capacity utilization). An important literature (summarized in
Bartelsman and Doms, 2000) has documented large and persistent productivity dispersion
within narrowly defined industries, and most of the explanations for this dispersion have fo-
cused on technological differences between firms. The empirical patterns documented in this
paper are similar to the ones uncovered in Syverson (2004 and 2007), but the economic mech-
anism that generates these patterns is rather different. In particular, while Syverson focuses
on a demand-side factor (consumers’ inability to switch between competing suppliers), I focus
on a supply-side argument (frictions in the market for capital).9,10 Hence, Syverson’s papers
and this paper offer complementary explanations of similar economic facts, and each expla-
nation is better suited to describe a different industry with different characteristics (spatial
differentiation versus decentralized input markets).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some institutional details on the markets
for commercial aircraft. Section 3 introduces a theoretical framework to study the effect of
market thickness on asset allocations and prices. The Section informally discusses the main
8See, also, Kim (1998); Asplund (2000); Ramey and Shapiro (2001); Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2005), and Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009).
9In independent work, Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) construct an index of sunkenness of capital
investments for U.S. manufacturing industries and empirically establish that the mean of industry productivity
is lower and the dispersion of productivity is higher in industries with a higher value of the index of sunkenness
of capital investments.
10By focusing on input markets, this paper shares some ideas with Melitz (2003), although the precise
economic mechanism is rather different. Similarly, this paper has a few similarities with some search-theoretic
analysis of the labor market. See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for a survey. See, also, Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2006), Bleakley and Lin (2007), Gan and Zhang (2006) and Teulings and Gautier (2005) for recent
analyses of increasing returns to scale in labor markets.
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economic forces behind the bilateral search model that is fully developed in Appendix A.
Section 4 presents the data used in this paper, and tests the model’s empirical predictions on
the effect of market thickness on asset allocations and prices. Section 5 concludes. Appendix
B calibrates the model to assess the magnitude of trading frictions.
2 Commercial Aircraft Markets
For several reasons, the aircraft market provides an ideal candidate for a general investigation
of a search model of trading in decentralized markets and, in particular, of scale effects.
First, commercial aircraft are registered goods with all major “life” events (date of first
flight, maintenance, scrappage, etc.) recorded, so very detailed data are available. Moreover,
focusing on well-defined assets such as commercial aircraft allows control over a number of
factors (e.g., technology differences, human-capital differences, market definitions, etc.) that
might confound cross-industries studies. This allows for a clean identification of the effects of
asset-market thickness on input allocations and prices.
Second, the secondary market for aircraft is a single, worldwide market. Aircraft are the
only form of capital equipment that can be delivered to a buyer or an operator anywhere in
the world within a day and get there under their own power. All airlines in the world use the
same types of aircraft, and there are relatively few types. Moreover, the aircraft market is a
market with almost perfect information about potential buyers and the quality of the assets.
Third, several facts suggests that trading frictions are important. In particular, aircraft
are traded in decentralized markets, organized around privately-negotiated transactions.11
Thus, there is no centralized exchange providing immediacy of trade and pre-trade price
transparency. To initiate a transaction, a prospective seller must contact multiple potential
buyers. Comparing two similar aircraft for sale is costly since aircraft sales involve the material
inspection of the aircraft, which could be located in two different countries. In addition, a sale
involves legal costs, which increase substantially if there are legal disputes over the title or if
the local aviation authority has deregistered the aircraft. In some cases, there could also be
outstanding bills for maintenance, fuel, and parking that have to be paid before the aircraft is
released by the local authority, and sold. Thus, aircraft are seldom sold at auctions. Pulvino
(1998) reports that in one of the first auctions, organized in 1994 to enhance the liquidity of
the market, only nine of the 35 aircraft offered for sale were sold. Some subsequent auctions
ended without even a single sale. Hence, aircraft markets share many features with other over-
the-counter markets for financial assets (mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, bank
loans, derivatives, etc.) and for real assets (real estate), in which trading involves material
and opportunity costs (Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2005 and 2007). As a result, most
11This is one characteristic that Rauch (1999) uses to measure asset-specificity. The idea is that if an asset
is sold on an organized exchange, then the market for this asset is thick and, hence, the asset is less specific
to the transaction.
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major carriers have staff devoted to the acquisition and disposition of aircraft, which suggests
that trade is not frictionless.
In addition, compared to financial markets and other equipment markets, aircraft markets
are “thin”: The absolute number of transactions in the aircraft market is small. For example,
in the 12 months between May 2002 and April 2003, of the total stock of 12,409 commercial
aircraft used for passenger transportation and older than two years, only 720 (5.8 percent)
traded.12 In “thin” markets, the search costs to find high-value buyers are usually large
(Ramey and Shapiro, 2001). Industry experts and market participants consider these frictions
a fundamental characteristic of aircraft markets. For example, according to Lehman Brothers
(1998): “The ratings agencies require an 18-month source of liquidity because this is the length
of time they feel it will take to market and resell the aircraft in order to maximize value.”
Hence, transaction prices are very sensitive to parties’ individual shocks, and the bargaining
power of sellers and buyers is an important determinant of transaction prices. For example,
Pulvino (1998) finds that sellers with bad financial status sell aircraft at a 14-percent discount
relative to the average market price.
Fourth, aircraft are differentiated products, designed to serve different markets and differ-
ent ranges. For example, a Boeing 747 is suited to markets in which both demand and distance
are large. Thus, the differential number of different airline markets imply that some aircraft
are more popular than others. Moreover, each type of aircraft requires human-capital invest-
ments in specific skills—for pilots, crew and mechanics—that increase the degree of physical
differentiation. For a given type, the number of annual transactions can be very small: Only
21 used units of the Boeing 747 traded in the 12-month period ending April 2003. Clearly,
the popularity of a given type also varies over time, as aircraft follow the typical life cycle of
products. Thus, two main factors affect the thickness of the market for a specific aircraft type
over time: the production of new units, and the retirement of old units. For example, the
Boeing 727 was the most popular commercial aircraft during the 1970s, when production rates
were high, but, today, it has a rather thin market as it has been phased out of production and
many units have been retired.
Airline industry experts and participants in the aircraft market consider the thickness of
the market a fundamental characteristic of an aircraft type. For example, as noted in the
introduction, Lehman Brothers considers “aircraft with a large number in current use across
a wide array of users [ . . . ] easier to resell or re-lease than aircraft with limited production
and usage.” Similarly, according to Wachovia Securities (2005): “[T]he following are drivers
of marketability of a commercial aircraft type: Number of current operators [ . . . ]; Number
of Aircraft in production run [ . . . ]; In-production status/backlog [ . . . ]; Existence of a
cargo conversion program [ . . . ]; Number of young aircraft on ground [ . . . ]”. Further,
describing the aircraft leasing market,13 Wachovia Securities (2005) states: “From a lessor’s
12The comparison with other capital goods is complicated because of the heterogeneity of capital goods.
In a cross-industry study of corporate asset sales, Schlingemann et al. (2002) report a cross-industry average
turnover of assets (measured in dollar values) of five percent. In their sample, more than ten two-digit
industries have an average value of turnover higher than ten percent, and in some two-digit industries, the
average value of turnover is as high as 23 percent.
13Leasing is very popular in the aircraft market, with about 50 percent of the current stock of commercial
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perspective, a good leasing asset is one of which, ‘if I get this aircraft back, I want a lot of
people that I can talk to about the plane . . . .’ ”14
Why should an aircraft with a large number in current use be easier to resell than an aircraft
with limited production? There are several, often reinforcing reasons. The most important
reason is that carriers tend to minimize the number of types of aircraft they operate in order
to achieve economies of scale in aircraft maintenance, in purchasing spare parts, in training of
pilots, crew and mechanics, and in scheduling flights.15 Hence, the number of current operators
of an aircraft type captures well the number of potential buyers (Benmelech and Bergman,
2008 and 2009; Gavazza, 2010). A larger number of potential buyers obviously increases the
probability that at least one carrier is seeking to acquire an aircraft. Furthermore, multimarket
contact and geographic proximity between carriers reduces some of the costs of trading, such
as the costs of inspecting the aircraft or registering it with the aviation authorities.16 As a
result, aircraft trade more frequently between two carriers operating in the same country than
between two carriers operating in different countries. Thus, on average, a seller is more likely
to be closer to a buyer whose fleet is composed of a more popular aircraft type. Moreover,
carriers finance the purchase of aircraft mainly by issuing debt secured by the aircraft, and
more-popular aircraft are better collateral. Hence, purchasing more-popular aircraft facilitates
the availability of external financing (Littlejohns and McGairl, 1998).
Overall, all of these observations suggest that trading frictions are important and vary
with market thickness. The next section introduces a theoretical framework that illustrates
more precisely how trading frictions affect equilibrium asset allocations and prices. A rich set
of comparative statics implications emerge from this framework, and I test them in Section 4.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this Section, I describe how we should theoretically expect asset allocations and prices to
differ in thick markets versus thin markets. In Appendix A, I set up a bilateral search model
to more formally investigate the effects of a thick asset market on allocations and prices.
Here, I informally discuss the main economic forces behind the model, leaving all derivations
to Appendix A. The model delivers testable implications regarding how trading frictions
vary with the thickness of the asset market and regarding the effects of these frictions on the
(endogenously determined) equilibrium asset allocations and prices.
aircraft being leased. Gavazza (2009) explores the effect of leasing on aircraft turnover. Gavazza (forthcoming)
explores how the liquidty/redeployability of aircraft affects whether aircraft are leased or not, the equilibrium
maturity and pricing of lease contracts. Section 4.7.1 presents a robustness check to control for the role of
leased aircraft.
14Wachovia Securities, Structured Products Research, Commercial ABS, September 2005.
15For example, in the United States, a successful carrier like Southwest flies one type of aircraft only, and
Jetblue flies two. Similarly, in Europe, Ryanair flies one type of aircraft only, while Easyjet flies two types.
Almost all small carriers in the world (below 25 aircraft) fly one type of aircraft only.
16In the United States, it is more time-consuming and costly for a carrier to register an aircraft that was
previously registered to another carrier in a different country than to register an aircraft that was previously
registered to another carrier in the United States. For many other countries, similar rules apply.
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To fix ideas, consider an industry that is populated by a continuum of firms (carriers).
Firms’ production function uses a single input (aircraft) to produce output (flights). For sim-
plicity, let us assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty and all aircraft are homogenous.
The model can be extended to capture these two factors explicitly, and all the empirical pre-
dictions still survive. Moreover, the exact form of product-market competition among firms
is not particularly relevant for the results. The only thing that matters is that firms have het-
erogenous productivity. More precisely, firms are differentiated by an exogenous productivity
parameter that evolves stochastically over time. Firms observe their productivity and, if they
own an aircraft, choose the hours of utilization of the aircraft to maximize the per-period
profits from its use, with more productive carriers choosing a higher level of utilization.17
The focus of the model is on the input market. Firms can choose whether or not to acquire
an aircraft if they do not own one, and whether or not to keep operating the aircraft or sell it if
they own one. If a firm wants to trade (either buy or sell) an aircraft, it enters a decentralized
search market in which it contacts other firms willing to trade. A firm seeking to trade an
asset meets other firms from the overall population according to a Poisson process. Once two
firms meet and are willing to trade, they negotiate a price to trade.
In this setting, firms endogenously select based on their productivity: Higher-productivity
firms choose to operate aircraft, and lower-productivity firms choose to stay out of the market.
Hence, there exists a unique buyers’ cutoff: a value in the productivity distribution such
that a firm that does not currently own an aircraft and whose productivity jumps above
the cutoff chooses to acquire one. Similarly, there exists a unique sellers’ cutoff: a value
in the productivity distribution such that a firm that currently owns an aircraft and whose
productivity falls below the cutoff chooses to sell it. When there are trading frictions, buyers’
cutoff is higher than sellers’ cutoff: Frictions create a wedge that prevents sellers from selling
and buyers from buying.
The main point is that the buyers’ and sellers’ cutoffs change with the thickness of the
asset market. The key economic force is that, under the search technology described above,
active sellers (buyers) meet active buyers (sellers) at a rate proportional to the measure of
active buyers (sellers). Therefore, the trading technology exhibits increasing returns to scale:
Doubling the masses of active buyers and active sellers more than doubles the flow of meetings.
Increasing returns in search nicely capture the idea that trading costs are decreasing with
trading volume and precisely fit in a simple way the facts about aircraft markets described in
Section 2. Thus, in a thicker market, the contact rate between buyers and sellers is higher,
so once on the market, assets with a thicker market trade faster. In this sense, assets with
a thicker market are more liquid (Lippmann and McCall, 1986). Instead, trading frictions
are higher for assets with a thin market, and these assets have a higher option value for
their owners: Firms choose to hold on to assets with thin markets for longer periods of time
in case their productivity rises in the future. As a result, sellers’ cutoff value is lower in
a thinner market: It is optimal for inefficient firms to keep their assets rather than selling
17When the profit function exhibits complementarities between the exogenous productivity of the firm
and the endogenous choice of capacity utilization, more-productive firms choose a higher level of capacity
utilization. Moreover, equilibrium profits are an increasing function of productivity. Hence, profits and
productivity move one-to-one with capacity utilization.
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them. Similarly, buyers’ cutoff value is higher in a thinner market: Only very productive
firms choose to incur the trading costs to acquire an aircraft. As the asset market becomes
thicker, sellers’ cutoff value increases and buyers’ cutoff value decreases. Indeed, in the limit
as the asset market becomes infinitely thick, buyers’ and sellers’ cutoffs converge, and the
frictionless Walrasian benchmark obtains.
Sellers’ and buyers’ cutoffs affect the entire (endogenous) distributions of aircraft operators.
In particular, the lower bound of aircraft operators’ productivity is higher when the market
is thicker. Thus, the equilibrium average productivity of aircraft operators is higher and the
equilibrium dispersion of productivity is lower in thicker aircraft markets. Since capacity
utilization moves one-to-one with productivity, capacity utilization is, on average, higher and
exhibits less dispersion for aircraft with a thicker market.18
Furthermore, when a buyer and a seller bargain over the price at which they trade the
asset, the individual abilities to generate cash-flow from the asset and the alternatives to
immediate trade determine the buyer’s willingness to pay, and the seller’s willingness to accept
and, thus, the transaction price. Hence, the effects of market thickness on the level of firms’
profitabilities transmit to the level of transaction prices. As a result, assets with a thicker
market have a higher average level of asset prices. Moreover, the value of searching for an
additional counterparty disciplines price dispersion. Since it is easier to find a counterparty
in a thicker market, the cross-sectional dispersion of transaction prices is lower.
In summary, the model makes the following predictions. As the market becomes thicker,
assets: 1) have a higher turnover; 2) have a higher average level of capacity utilization; 3)
have a lower dispersion of capacity utilization; and 4) have a higher average price; and 5) have
a lower dispersion of transaction prices.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Sources of Data
The empirical analysis in this paper combines four distinct datasets. The first dataset is an
extensive database that tracks the history of each western-built commercial aircraft. I use this
database to construct two measures of the thickness of each type of aircraft in each year. I then
match the two measures (described in detail below) to the other datasets to investigate the
effects of market thickness on asset allocations and prices. The second database reports the
aircraft flying hours for the period 1990–2002, and I use this information to investigate several
features of aircraft capacity utilization. The third dataset reports the prices of several aircraft
models during the period 1967–2003. These prices are average values, similar to “Blue Book”
18The model implies that productivity, profitability and capacity utilization are very closely related. The
data seem to confirm this. For example, at the aggregate level, aircraft are parked inactive in the desert more
frequently in recessions than in booms. After 9/11, when the profitability of the airline industry was severely
hit, a large number of carriers decide to ground aircraft. As a result, capacity utilization decreased. Similarly,
at the carrier level, the data reveal that Southwest has higher capacity utilization than other U.S. carriers,
and that capacity utilization is substantially lower before a carrier enters into bankruptcy.
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prices. The fourth dataset reports actual prices for a large number of transactions during the
period 1978–1991. I now describe each dataset in more detail.
Aircraft History—This database, compiled by a producer of aviation-market information
systems, reports the history of each Western-built commercial aircraft up to April 2003. For
each aircraft serial number, the dataset contains information on the type (e.g., Boeing 737);
the model (e.g., Boeing 737-600); the “birth” of the aircraft (date of the first flight); the
sequence of operators with the relevant dates of operation; the operational role with each
operator; and, if the aircraft is no longer in use, the date of the “death” of the aircraft (date
the aircraft was scrapped).
Aircraft Utilization—This database, compiled by the producer of the aircraft history
dataset, reports detailed information on the utilization of each aircraft by its operator. More
precisely, the file reports the monthly flying hours of each aircraft from January 1990 to April
2003. Monthly utilization is aggregated at the year level, thus obtaining an annual panel
for the 1990–2002 period. I discard observations (a serial-number–year pair) if the aircraft
changes operator in the year in which the aircraft is traded, in order to be able to impute the
annual utilization to a single operator.19
Blue Book Prices—This dataset was compiled by a consulting company that specializes
in aircraft appraisals. It is an unbalanced panel reporting the historic values of prices of
different vintages for the most popular models during the period 1967–2003. The prices are
based on reported transactions and on the company’s experience in consulting, appraisal and
fleet evaluation. The prices assume that the transaction was made on the basis of a single
unit bought with cash from a non-bankrupt seller. All values are in U.S. dollars, and I have
deflated them using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator, with 2000 as the base year.
Transaction Prices—This dataset reports actual transaction prices for almost all aircraft
traded by U.S. corporations during the period 1978–1991. Prior to 1992, the Department
of Transportation (DOT) required price disclosure for all aircraft purchased or sold by U.S.
corporations. The transaction prices used in this paper are based on these DOT filings. For
each transaction, the filings report the aircraft serial number, buyer and seller identities,
transaction price, date of transaction, and whether the transaction was a straight sale or a
sale/leaseback. The dataset also reports some technical information, such as the age of the
aircraft, the engine type, and the engine noise stage. In the empirical analysis of this paper, I
focus on all used aircraft transactions reported in this dataset. All values are in nominal U.S.
dollars, and I have again deflated them to the year 2000. Pulvino (1998) describes further
details of this dataset.
4.2 Data Description
From the Aircraft History dataset, I calculate the thickness/size of the market for each aircraft
in a given year in two different ways. The first is by counting the total stock outstanding of
aircraft of type i in year t, and I call this variable Airtypeit. The second is by counting
the total number of carriers operating at least one aircraft of type i in year t, and I call this
19The results are almost identical when observations are retained.
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Fig. 1: Transaction price vs. Blue Book price
variable Optypeit. In the theoretical framework, the two variables are identical, and in the
data, they are very highly correlated (the correlation is at least .91 in the samples on which
the regressions are run). Note that the two variables vary across both different aircraft types
i and different years t.20
I then match Airtypeit and Optypeit to the dataset on aircraft utilization and the two
datasets on prices. More precisely, to investigate the effect of market thickness on allocations,
I match Airtypeit andOptypeit to each aircraft’s holding duration to study whether aircraft
with a thicker market have higher turnover. Further, I match Airtypeit and Optypeit to
the annual flying hours fhjkit of aircraft j of model k type i in year t to study how average
utilization and the dispersion of utilization levels covary with market thickness. More precisely,
to investigate the dispersion of utilization levels, I calculate the average flying hours of all age-
a–model-k–type-i–year-t tuples, fhakit. I then compute the absolute value of the percentage
deviation of the flying hours fhjkit of aircraft j of Agejkit = a–model-k–type-i–year-t from
the average fhakit, i.e.,
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ .21
Similarly, to investigate the effect of market thickness on the average level of asset prices,
I match the price p¯akit of aircraft of age-a–model-k–type-i–year-t reported in the Blue Book
20It is important to note that the measures of market thickness are at the aircraft-type level. As specified
above, a type is, for example, Boeing 737, Boeing 747, MD-80, and so on. Within each type, there might
be different models. For example, for the type Boeing 737, we have models B737-200, B737-300, and so on.
Within each type, the technical specifications of different models are very similar. Thus, comparisons between
types exactly capture differences in market size, which is consistent with industry norms.
21I am using the absolute percentage deviation rather than the standard deviation because the absolute
percentage deviation rescales the deviations by the value of the average, while the standard deviation does
not. For example, consider two aircraft types that differ in their average capacity utilization (because of
their size), but have the same standard deviation of utilization. Then, one standard deviation represents a
larger percentage deviation from the mean for the aircraft that has a lower mean. In summary, the absolute
percentage deviation is independent of the average, and this is why I use it.
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dataset with the corresponding values of Airtypeit andOptypeit. To investigate the effect of
market thickness on the dispersion of transaction prices, I first match each transaction price
from the transaction dataset with the average prices of the corresponding age-model-type-
year tuple from the Blue Book dataset. Then, I construct the absolute percentage deviation
of the transaction price from the Blue Book price
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ , where pjit is the transaction
price of aircraft j of Agejit = a–model-k–type-i–year-t, and p¯akit is the Blue Book price
just defined. Next, I match this measure of price dispersion for model k to the corresponding
values of Airtypeit and Optypeit of type i (k ∈ i). Figure 1 shows that Blue Book prices and
transaction prices are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is equal to .96), so that the
Blue Book prices capture the average price of a specific aircraft very well. Moreover, Figure
1 shows that there are some differences between the transaction prices and the Blue Book
prices, and in the empirical analysis, I investigate whether these differences are systematically
correlated with market thickness.22
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Panel A considers the turnover of assets by measuring holding durations. Overall, this is the
largest sample, since it is based on the entire Aircraft History Dataset, and, thus, it covers a
longer time period than the other datasets. The average duration is around seven years, with
a standard deviation of 6.5 years. The duration of the first operator of each aircraft tends
to be, on average, nine years, longer than subsequent durations. Some of the durations are
ongoing—that is, they are right-censored—and around 70 percent of durations are completed.
Moreover, the total number of operators is very large: the dataset reports approximately
1,500 distinct operators during the (long) period considered. Hence, panel A shows that
Airtype and Optype vary substantially, both across types and within type over time. Some
aircraft types are very popular and, thus, have been produced in large numbers and have
many operators; others have been less successful or are old types that are retired during the
sample period and have few operators. The average of Airtype is 1167 and the standard
deviation is 1007; the average of Optype is 96 and the standard deviation is 85.
Panel B considers aircraft utilizations. On average, aircraft fly around 2,700 hours per
year, with a standard deviation of 1,100 hours. Around four percent of all observations in
the sample have flying hours equal to zero—that is, they are parked inactive in the desert. A
fraction of this mass of inactive aircraft is sold to new carriers that acquire capital to enter
the industry, and the remaining fraction reenters service with the original owner. Considering
only aircraft with positive flying hours, the average utilization is 2,860 hours with a standard
deviation of 960 hours. Since the dataset reports utilization data only from 1990, the averages
of Airtype and Optype are now higher and, again, they show considerable variation: The
22Alternatively, I could investigate how average prices vary with the thickness of the asset market using
the transaction price pjit as the dependent variable. However, there are at least two disadvantages to this
procedure: 1) the dataset would no longer be a panel dataset; thus, the Arellano and Bond procedure described
below cannot be employed; and 2) the number of observations would be smaller, and, in particular, the time-
dimension would be much shorter. Similarly, I could investigate how the dispersion of transaction prices vary
with the thickness of the asset market by calculating the absolute percentage deviation of the transaction price
from the average transaction price of comparable aircraft. The main disadvantage of this procedure is that,
for many aircraft, the average would be calculated from very few observations, often just one.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Asset Turnover Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Median
Holding duration 7.02 6.46 1 37 5
Types of aircraft 33
Aircraft per type—Airtype 1167.6 1007.1 2 4173 905
Operators per type—Optype 96.13 85.61 1 345 63
Panel B: Aircraft Utilization
Flying hours fhjkit 2741.13 1097.02 0 5890 2773
Absolute percentage deviation
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ .1895 .2728 0 9.01 .11
Parked aircraft .043 .203 0 1 0
Types of aircraft 26
Aircraft per type—Airtype 1439.58 1100.63 7 4116 1105
Operators per type—Optype 122.16 100.84 1 345 68
Age 12.29 7.63 3 41 10
Panel C: Blue Book Prices
Average price p¯jkit 28.35 24.20 .24 145.5 21.27
Types of aircraft 18
Aircraft per type—Airtype 1057 954 45 4173 884
Operators per type—Optype 86.95 81.09 9 345 60
Age 10.84 7.11 1 36 9
Panel D: Transaction Prices
Transaction price pjkit 30.60 24.47 .29 162.3 28.56
Absolute percentage deviation
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ .171 .193 0 1.26 .09
Types of aircraft 13
Aircraft per type—Airtype 960.6 612.2 75 2340 917
Operators per type—Optype 74.45 46.75 9 215 53
Age 7.35 6.94 0 25 7
Notes—This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel A presents summary statistics
for the Aircraft History dataset. These data are used in the test of prediction 1 on the effect of market thickness on asset turnover.
Holding Duration measures the number of years the aircraft has been with an operator. Many durations are ongoing, so this is
a censored sample. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is the total number of
carriers operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Panel B presents summary statistics for the Aircraft Utilization dataset.
These data are used in the test of prediction 2 on the effect of market thickness on the level of utilization, and prediction 3 on
the effect of market thickness on the dispersion of utilization. The data correspond to the years 1990-2002. Parked aircraft is
a binary indicator taking a value of one if the aircraft has zero flying hours for the entire year. Flying hours fhjkit is the total
number of hours that the aircraft has flown in year t. Absolute percentage deviation
∣∣∣∣
fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣∣ is the absolute percentage
deviation of the annual hours flown fhjkit of aircraft j of Agejkit = a–model-k–type-i–year-t from the average fhakit,where the
average annual hours flown fhakit are calculated using all aircraft of age-a–model-k–type-i–year-t. Panel C presents summary
statistics for the “Blue Book” prices dataset. These data are used in the test of prediction 4 on the effect of market thickness
on the level of asset prices. Panel D presents summary statistics for the dataset of U.S. transactions. These data are used in the
test of prediction 5 on the effect of market thickness on the dispersion of transaction prices. Absolute percentage deviation∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akit
p¯akit
∣∣∣ is the absolute percentage deviation of the transaction price pjit of aircraft j of Agejit = a–model-k–type-i–year-t,
from the Blue Book price p¯akit of aircraft of age-a–model-k–type-i–year-t reported in the Blue Book dataset. Blue Book prices
in Panel C and Transaction prices in Panel D are in millions of U.S. dollars and have been deflated using the GDP Implicit Price
Deflator, with 2000 as the base year.
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averages are 1,435 aircraft and 123 operators, respectively; the standard deviations are 1,101
aircraft and 101 operators, respectively.
Panel C provides summary statistics for the Blue Book dataset. There are 18 different
aircraft types in the sample. The average Blue Book price of an aircraft in the sample is 28
million (year 2000) dollars, and there is substantial variation in prices (the standard deviation
is 24 million dollars). Airtype and Optype show substantial variation, both across types
and within type, over time. For example, looking at just the Boeing 737, there are as many
as 4,173 units and 345 operators in 2003, and as few as 333 units and 38 operators in 1973.
Panel D considers transaction prices. The time period during which transaction prices were
reported to the DOT (1978–1991) is considerably shorter than the time period of the Blue Book
prices (1967–2003). Thus, the number of observations is smaller (1,555); the number of aircraft
types is also smaller (13); and, overall, the variables exhibit smaller variations. Nonetheless,
the main variable of interest—the absolute percentage deviation of the transaction price from
the corresponding Blue Book price—shows considerable variation (the standard deviation is
19 percent) around its mean of 17 percent. Market thickness—either Airtype or Optype—
again shows substantial variation, both across types and within type, over time.
The strengths of the data lie in their extensive coverage of many aspects of the aircraft
market. In particular, the richness of the aircraft history dataset allows me to measure very
precisely the thickness of the market of each aircraft type, with variation both across aircraft
types and within type over time. Thus, in the empirical analysis, I can control for several
features of the asset that are often unobserved in studies that rely solely on cross-sectional
data. The time-series variation helps me control for several time-invariant unobserved factors
and obtain convincing evidence regarding how trading frictions due to market thinness affect
aircraft allocations and aircraft prices.23
4.3 Some Suggestive Evidence on Trading Frictions
Before turning to a more formal analysis, I present some simple conditional correlations that
speak directly to the importance of search frictions generated by thin markets. In an ideal
setting, we could obtain direct evidence on the importance of frictions by looking at how
long an aircraft stays on the market before selling or at how many potential buyers a seller
contacts before closing a sale, and see how these quantities are related to the thinness/thickness
of the asset market. While this would be a very interesting exercise, these quantities are,
unfortunately, unobserved in the data. However, from the data, I can reconstruct one very
closely related measure of delay that can directly illustrate the frictions implied by market
thinness. In particular, from the Aircraft History dataset, for each leased aircraft, I can
reconstruct how many days it stays with its lessor between one lessee and the next.24 These
delays are a precise example of the frictions that the paper highlights— delays in trading—
rather than, for example, transaction costs such as lawyers’ fees.
Lessors appear to be more sophisticated than carriers at turning their aircraft over (Gavazza,
2009). Hence, delays between two consecutive lessees can be interpreted as a lower bound on
23All empirical results are robust to dropping the smallest and the largest one percent of the observations.
24Thus, I can have multiple observations for the same aircraft (a serial number).
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Table 2: Delays before Leasing Transactions: Negative Binomial Regressions
Days between two lessees (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
.06795
(.00782)
.06410
(.00779)
.04029
(.01310)
.03633
(.01305)
Age squared
−.00054
(.00024)
−.00041
(.00023)
−.00034
(.00039)
−.00019
(.00039)
Log(Airtype)
−.20638
(.02087)
−.25078
(.04050)
Log(Optype)
−.13902
(.02411)
−.16737
(.04649)
Log-Likelihood −30637.14 −30667.57 −7782.05 −7793.91
# Obs 9358 9358 4396 4396
Notes—This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients of negative binomial regressions.
The dependent variable is equal to the number of days that an aircraft stays with its lessor after it has been
returned from a lessee and before it is delivered to a new, different lessee. Age is the age of the aircraft
(in years). Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is the
total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the
aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. The equations estimated in columns (1) and (2) contain aircraft type
fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported). The equations estimated in columns (3) and (4) contain
aircraft (serial number) fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported).
the delays that carriers expect when they put their owned aircraft up for sale. Indeed, the data
show that a large fraction of these delays are very short: the median is zero days. However,
the distribution has a long tail, thus increasing the average: 67 (90) percent of the observa-
tion have delays within one month (year) and the average delay is 115 days. Clearly, if there
were no frictions, we would expect no delay at all between consecutive lessees. Moreover, if
frictions did not vary with market thickness, we would expect Airtype and Optype to be
uncorrelated with delays.
In Table 2, I report the results of several negative binomial regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the number of days between two consecutive lessees, and the main explanatory
variable of interest is the (log of the) thickness of the aircraft market.25 I also include year
fixed effects and aircraft type fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), and year fixed effects and
individual aircraft (a serial number) fixed effects in columns (3) and (4).26 As the table clearly
25I employ a negative binomial specification to more precisely account for the many zeros (about 55 percent
of the observations have zero days of delay between two consecutive leases), and the small set of values that
the dependent takes on.
26As Neyman and Scott (1948) first observed, estimating fixed effects in a non-linear model could generate
the incidental parameter problem if the number of observations per each fixed effect were small. However,
when using year and aircraft type fixed effects, we have a large number of observations and not too many fixed
effects, so the incidental parameter problem is not a concern in the specifications of columns (1) and (2). In
the specifications of columns (3) and (4), we have many more fixed effects. Hence, as shown by Hausman, Hall
and Griliches (1984), we can use a conditional likelihood approach to consistently estimate the parameters of a
negative binomial regression with a large number of fixed effects. However, the use of individual aircraft fixed
effects in the specifications of columns (3) and (4) substantially reduces the number of observations compared
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shows, aircraft with a larger market are redeployed faster to a new lessee, and the results are
robust to different ways of measuring market thickness. Moreover, the negative binomial
specifications imply that the coefficients of log(Airtype) and log(Optype) are equal to
the elasticities. Thus, according to the more conservative estimates of columns (1) and (2), a
ten-percent increase in the stock of aircraft Airtype is associated with a two-percent decrease
in the days between two consecutive lessees, and a ten-percent increase in the stock of oper-
ators Optype is associated with a 1.4-percent decrease in the days between two consecutive
lessees. At the average value of the variables, these elasticities imply that doubling market
thickness (either 158 aircraft per type or 12 operators per type in this sample) decreases the
days between consecutive lessees by about two to three days.27
While the results reported in Table 2 are consistent with the idea that market thickness
generates frictions that affect the allocation of (leased) aircraft, they should also be interpreted
with some caution, for several reasons. First, the data do not allow us to identify leases that
have been renewed by the previous operator. Thus, the inference is based on the selected
sample of leased aircraft for which the old lessee decided not to renew the lease. However, a
few robustness checks using the cumulative number of days of delay for each leased aircraft
throughout its “life” confirm the results of Table 2.28 These checks suggest that sample
selection is not a big concern and corroborate that delays before transactions are shorter for
aircraft with a thicker market. Second, in the data, the precise date on which the lessor puts
the aircraft on the market and starts searching for a new lessee—after the old lessee decides
not to renew the lease—is unobserved. However, there does not seem to be any good reason
why lessors of aircraft with a thinner market should start searching for a new lessee later than
lessors of aircraft with a thicker market. Indeed, the above evidence suggests that lessors
should anticipate longer delays and start searching for a lessee earlier when aircraft have a
thinner market. Third, since the distribution of delays has a long right tail, the presence
of some outliers may drive the estimates of the regression coefficients. However, I have also
estimated regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator taking the value
of zero if there were zero days of delay, and one if delays were strictly positive, and these
regressions (not reported) confirm that aircraft with a thicker market are redeployed faster
to a new lessee. Fourth, the magnitude of the estimated effects seems small. However, since
the precise date on which the lessor starts searching for a new lessee is unobserved, it is not
possible to assess the true extent of these delays. Nonetheless, we can conclude that the
evidence suggests that market thinness generates frictions that affect transactions. I next
turn to a more formal empirical analysis of the causal effects of asset market thickness on
to the specifications of columns (1) and (2). The reason is either because there is just one observation per
serial number, or because all outcomes within a serial number are identical (and equal to zero.)
27The results are robust to the inclusion of the fraction of all aircraft of a given type that is leased in a
given year as an additional explanatory variable.
28More precisely, I calculate the cumulative number of days of delay for each leased aircraft throughout its
“life” and investigate how it covaries with the size of the aircraft market. Due to some coding issues, calculating
the cumulative number of days of delay is not obvious for aircraft that were owned and later became leased,
and vice versa. In any case, using different imputation assumptions, or discarding aircraft that switched from
owned to leased or vice versa, I always obtain the same result as the regressions of Table 2: Delays are shorter
for aircraft with a thicker market. This suggests that sample selection is not a big concern.
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asset allocations and prices.
4.4 Empirical Framework and Identification
The theoretical framework of Section 3 guides the empirical tests of the effects of market
thickness on allocations and prices. The empirical specification is more flexible than the model,
thus allowing departures from some of its simplifying assumptions (such as no depreciation,
one asset type, and no aggregate shocks). More precisely, I specify the following equation:
yjkit = βZjkit + ζk + ηt + ǫjkit
= β0 + βALog(Thicknessit)+ βXXjkit + ζk + ηt + ǫjkit (1)
where the dependent variable yjkit is one of the outcomes of interest (holding duration, uti-
lization, dispersion of utilization, average price, price dispersion) for aircraft j of model k type
i in year t. Thicknessit is either Airtype or Optype. Xjkit is specific to each individual
aircraft—i.e., Agejkit. ζk is an aircraft-model fixed effect, ηt is a year fixed effect, and ǫjkit
is an idiosyncratic unobserved component. Thus, the variables Xjkit, ζk and ηt control for
vintage, aircraft-type, and year effects that the model does not consider.
The use of the quantity-based measures Airtype and Optype creates a few potential
challenges to identifying the effects of the size of the asset market in equation (1). The reason
is that both measures of market thickness are stock variables that include the flows of new
aircraft/operators, and time-varying unobservables that affect the outcome variables might be
correlated with these new flows and, thus, with Airtype and Optype. In particular, unob-
servable demand shocks can pose a threat to the identification of the role of market thickness.
For example, an increase in the demand for flights could simultaneously increase aircraft de-
mand, production of new units—and, thus, Airtype—and entry of new carriers—and, thus,
Optype—on one side, and capacity utilization and/or prices on the other side. Similarly,
if resale costs or aircraft-maintenance costs change over time, they could simultaneously af-
fect aircraft demand—and, thus, Airtype and Optype—and capacity utilization and prices.
Moreover, if the unobservables are serially correlated, the unobservables are correlated also
with lags and leads of market thickness.
The previous demand-side argument could invalidate the tests of some of the predictions—
in particular, the predictions on the effect of market thickness on the average level of capacity
utilization and on the average level of prices. However, the argument does not have obvious
effects on the other predictions that are more unique to the search-frictions framework that
is the focus of the paper—the predictions on the effect of market thickness on the turnover of
assets, on the dispersion of capacity utilization, and on the dispersion of transaction prices.
At the same time, it is clearly possible that some demand shocks that are heterogenous across
different aircraft types generate predictions similar to those of the theoretical framework of
Section 3. For example, an increase in demand for regional aircraft may lead to an increase
in turnover because of an increase in the reallocation of aircraft across regional carriers.
The inclusion of year dummies ηt allows me to control for all aggregate effects and any
type of serial correlation of all these effects and, thus, to capture aggregate increase in demand
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and the serial correlation of aggregate demand. Nonetheless, there might still be within-year
variations in demand between models correlated with Airtype and Optype, and persistent.
In principle, the direction of the bias caused by variations in demand between models within
a given year is ambiguous: Deviations from year fixed effects could very well be negatively
correlated with market thickness. The reason is that the effect of an increase in demand could
be bigger for “marginal” aircraft types—that is, aircraft that are used by few operators and
flown only when demand is very high.
In any case, when I perform the analysis on panel data—capacity utilization, dispersion
of capacity utilization, Blue Book price—I deal with these endogeneity concerns using a pro-
cedure that uses the insights of Arellano and Bond (1991), but that employs a richer set of
supply-side instruments. Arellano and Bond suggest estimating a panel-data regression as
equation (1) first-differencing the variables to eliminate the persistent component of the un-
observable, and then instrumenting the first-difference of a potentially endogenous variable
∆zit = zit − zit−1. More formally, let the outcome equation and the error term be:
yjkit = βZjkit + ζk + ηt + ǫjkit, (2)
ǫjkit = ρǫjkit−1 + νjkit. (3)
Simply taking first-differences of the variables in equation (2) eliminates the aircraft-model
fixed effect ζ i, as well as any fixed term constant within aircraft j. However, first-differences do
not eliminate the persistent component of the error term, as ∆yjkit = β∆Zjkit+∆ηt+∆ǫjkit.
Subtracting ρyjkit−1 from yjkit eliminates ǫjkit − ρǫjkit−1, leaving only the innovation νjkit of
the unobservable:
yjkit = ρyjkit−1 + βZjkit − βρZjkit−1 + (1− ρ) ζk + ηt − ρηt−1 + νjkit. (4)
Taking first-differences, the following equation obtains:
∆yjkit = ρ∆yjkit−1 + β∆Zjkit − βρ∆Zjkit−1 +∆ηt − ρ∆ηt−1 +∆νjkit. (5)
In the differenced form, however, the new errors ∆νjkit are correlated with the differenced
lagged dependent variable ∆yjit−1 by construction, and potentially with the variables ∆Zjkit
and ∆Zjkit−1, as well. Therefore, a vector W of instruments is required to construct moments
E (∆νjkit ∗W ) , and to estimate equation (5) via GMM.
Arellano and Bond use the lagged values yjkit−h and Zjkit−h with lags h ≥ 2 as instruments
for ∆yjkit−1 and ∆Zjkit−l l = 0, 1, respectively, as the new error term ∆νjkit is uncorrelated
by construction with lags of order higher than two.29 These instruments yjkit−h and Zjkit−h
29First-differencing the data introduces serial correlation in the new errors ∆vjkit . Arellano and Bover
(1995) suggest an alternative procedure that does not introduce serial correlation in the new errors. The
procedure—called Orthogonal Deviations—consists of constructing the deviation for each observation from
the average of future observations in the sample for the same panel-id. However, this approach does not
work with autocorrelated errors, as in equation (3). Alternatively, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998) suggest adding the original equation (1) in levels to the GMM criterion, instrumenting the
endogenous variable in levels with first-differences. However, these additional moments are valid under the
assumption that first-differences of the endogenous variables are uncorrelated with the persistent component
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with lags h ≥ 2 are “mechanically” correlated with the potentially endogenous variables
∆yjkit−1 and ∆Zjkit−l. Hence, following Arellano and Bond, I use yjkit−h with lags h = 2 as
the instrument for the lagged endogenous variable ∆yjkit−1.
The commercial-aircraft setting provides me with instruments for the main endogenous
variable—changes in market thickness—that have a stronger economic content than Arellano
and Bond’s instruments—i.e., instruments that shift the endogenous variable for supply-side
reasons. In particular, I previously discussed that the production of new units and the re-
tirement of old units are the two main factors affecting the thickness of the market for a
specific aircraft type over time. The instruments shift one of these two factors for supply-
side reasons. More precisely, several papers have empirically documented the importance
of learning-by-doing in aircraft production: The costs of producing an aircraft decrease with
previous cumulative production (Wright, 1936; Asher, 1956; Alchian, 1963; Argote and Epple,
1990; Benkard, 2000). Thus, everything else equal, the supply of new units in year t is higher
if cumulative production of the same type of aircraft was higher in year t− 2. In other words,
cumulative production in year t−2 is correlated for supply-side reasons with one component of
the endogenous variable—changes in market thickness—but, by construction, is uncorrelated
with the innovation in demand in period t—i.e., it is a good instrument. Moreover, lags of
cumulative production of order higher than t−2 are good instruments too, in particular given
the time it takes to build an aircraft (12 to 18 months).
Furthermore, the richness of the data also allows me to use other supply-side instruments
that should not be correlated with year-to-year short-run variations in demand between dif-
ferent types. In particular, I use the number of years since the aircraft type was first released
by its manufacturer; the stock of aircraft of the same type produced more than 25 years ago;
the (deflated) price of aluminum,30 and the one-year and two-year lags, each interacted with
aircraft characteristics (the number of seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off
weight, and the number of years since the release date);31 and the average number of days of
strike per worker in the manufacturing sector in the country of the aircraft manufacturer,32
the lags up to three years, and their interactions with aircraft characteristics (the number of
seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the number of years since the
release date). The idea of these instruments is the following. For a similar learning-by-doing
argument, we can expect the supply of new units to be lower if the aircraft type was recently
released by the manufacturer. The number of aircraft retired is, on average, higher if the
existing stock of aircraft is old—i.e., if the number of aircraft produced more than 25 years
ago is high. The supply of new units should be lower if the price of the aluminum—one of
the main materials used in the production of aircraft—is higher. The supply of new units
of the unobservable, an assumption that is likely to be violated in the current context.
30The price of aluminum is obtained from the EconStats website, from data collected by the U.S. Geological
Survey. Available at http://www.econstats.com/spot/rt alum.htm
31I use only two- and three-year lags of the deflated price of aluminum in the construction of all instruments
used in the regressions that investigate the effect of market thickness on the level of prices reported in Section
4.6.1. This is because the use of the contemporaneous price of aluminum may not satisfy the exclusion
restriction needed for the validity of the instruments.
32The strike data are obtained from the Laborsta database operated by the International Labour Office,
Bureau of Statistics. Available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
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Fig. 2: Deliveries of new Boeing 737 (left panel) and price of a ten-year old Boeing 737-200ADV
(right panel).
should be lower if the number of strikes in the manufacturing sector in the country where
the aircraft is assembled is higher. Indeed, these instruments are jointly significant, and they
are not weak: The F -test on the exogenous instruments has values above 30 in regressions
equivalent to the “first stage” of Two-Stage Least Squares.
In summary, the Arellano-Bond procedure described by equations (2) to (5) removes any
type-specific fixed component—e.g., time-invariant aircraft quality—and any type-specific per-
sistent component—e.g., demand shocks, fuel efficiency, resale costs, and maintenance costs.
In addition, the supply-side instruments directly address the possibility of spurious correla-
tions due to type-specific innovations in unobservable demand.
As Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate, the difference-GMM procedure does not work
well if the dependent variable—in this case, capacity utilization, dispersion of capacity utiliza-
tion, and Blue Book price—is very persistent. However, this does not appear to be a concern
in this case since the notorious cyclicality of the airline industry implies that capacity uti-
lization and prices vary over time (Pulvino, 1995; Benmelech and Bergman, 2009). Similarly,
the two main shifters of Airtype and Optype (production of new aircraft and retirement
of old aircraft) exhibit substantial year-to-year variation. For example, Figure 2 depicts the
time-series of deliveries of new aircraft and the price (in millions of year-2000 dollars) of a
ten-year-old model of the most popular aircraft type, the Boeing 737.
In the analysis of the effect of market thickness on asset turnover and on the dispersion of
transaction prices, either panel-data are not available or the difference-GMM procedure is not
appropriate, as will become clear below. However, the instruments can still be exploited. In
particular, I use the following instruments for the potentially endogenous variable: cumulative
production in year t− 5; the stock of aircraft of the same type produced more than 25 years
ago; the (deflated) price of aluminum, interacted with aircraft characteristics (the number of
seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the number of years since
the release date); and the average number of days of strike per worker in the manufacturing
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sector in the country of the aircraft manufacturer, alone and interacted with aircraft charac-
teristics (the number of seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the
number of years since the release date). When panel-data are not available, the assumptions
required for the instruments to yield consistent estimates are stronger than when panel-data
are available and difference-GMM can be employed. More precisely, as pointed out previously,
if the unobservables are very persistent, even distant lags of the endogenous variable remain
correlated with the unobservables. Hence, to reduce endogeneity concerns to a minimum, I am
using very distant lags of cumulative production (year t− 5). Moreover, the other supply-side
instruments are arguably uncorrelated with demand-side shocks.
4.5 Results: the Effect of Market Thickness on Asset Allocations
This subsection investigates the effect of market thickness on two aspects related to asset
allocations. The first is the effect on asset turnover. The second is the effect on capacity
utilization—I analyze the effect of asset market thickness on both the average level of utiliza-
tion and the dispersion of utilization levels.
4.5.1 Asset Turnover
The first implication of the model that I test is that assets trade more frequently when their
market gets thicker. The theoretical framework highlights that the combination of two factors
should affect assets’ trading patterns. First, assets with a thicker market should trade more
frequently because they stay “on the market” for a shorter period of time. The economic
intuition is that the trading technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, and, thus, trading
frictions decrease with the size of the market. Indeed, this is exactly what the analysis of
delays between two consecutive lessees indicates. Second, the time it takes to cash in on the
asset is a cost for the seller. When assets have a thin market, this cost is higher, making the
owner less likely to put the asset on the market for sale. Hence, owners choose to hold on to
assets with a thin market for longer periods of time.
As mentioned in the description of the data, the data do not allow me to separately
identify these two effects in a precise way for all aircraft (owned and leased). The analysis
of delays between two consecutive lessees indicates that the first factor has an effect on the
allocation of leased aircraft. In any case, it is plausible to expect that the second factor has
a bigger economic relevance. Here, I simply analyze the effect of asset-market thickness on
asset turnover, investigating the holding durations of each aircraft. More precisely, I use a Cox
proportional hazard model for the probability of trading an aircraft. Since the specification I
use is slightly different from equation (1), I now describe it in some detail. The Cox model
assumes that the probability of trading aircraft jit after s years from the acquisition, given
that the aircraft has not been traded before, is equal to:
hjkit (s) = h0i (s) exp (βALog(Thicknessit)+ βXXjkit + ηt) . (6)
where k denotes a model, i denotes a type, and t denotes a year; h0i (s) is the baseline hazard
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function, allowed to vary across aircraft types; Thicknessit is either Airtype or Optype;
Xjkit is the Age of the aircraft at the beginning of the spell; ηt is a year fixed effect.
33,34
Equation (6) represents a very flexible specification of the conditional probability of trading
an aircraft, since the entire shape of the baseline hazard h0i (s) is allowed to vary across aircraft
types.35 Moreover, this specification does not impose any functional form on the type-specific
baseline hazard h0i (s), so the effect of market thickness is identified purely from variation in
Airtype or Optype within a type i.36
As highlighted in the previous section, a potential concern with estimating equation (6) is
that the quantity-based measure Airtype or Optype could be correlated with some unob-
served components of demand. For example, an unobserved increase in the demand for flights
could simultaneously increase production of aircraft and volume of trade, and Airtype or
Optype might be correlated with this shock. A few papers in the literature document pat-
terns consistent with this idea in the aggregate economy: Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)
report that the number of plants sold is higher in expansion years than in recession years, and
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) document that the amount of capital reallocation between firms
is procyclical. Thus, a positive correlation between Airtype or Optype and asset turnover
could be a confirmation of Maksimovic and Phillips’s and Eisfeldt and Rampini’s findings.
Year fixed effects already capture most of the year-to-year variation in demand, but there
might still be within-year variations in demand between aircraft types that are correlated
with the size of the asset market.
To address this potential concern, I use a two-step control function approach as in Blundell
and Powell (2003), with instruments for Log(Airtype) or Log(Optype).37 As the previous
section describes, I employ instruments that arguably shift the thickness of the asset market
variable independently of short-run demand shocks: cumulative production in year t− 5; the
stock of aircraft of the same type produced more than 25 years ago; the (deflated) price of
aluminum and its lags, interacted with aircraft characteristics (the number of seats, the num-
33To prevent the incidental parameter problem when there were few observations within a fixed effect, I have
grouped all years prior to 1960 in a single time fixed effect (the excluded category), and in the specifications
that include carriers’ fixed effects, all carriers with fewer than 50 observations in a single carrier-fixed effect
(the excluded category).
34I have also estimated a version of equation (6) that includes aircraft-vintage fixed effects to control for
the year of birth of the aircraft instead of year fixed effects. The results are almost identical to the results in
Table 3 and, thus, are omitted.
35I have also estimated a more restrictive specification that allows aircraft-type fixed effects ζi to shift the
hazard only proportionally. The precise equation is:
hjkit (s) = h0 (s) exp (βALog(Thicknessit)+ βXXjkit + ζi + ηt) .
The results are almost identical to those reported in Table 3, and, thus, are omitted.
36The coefficient of the variable Age at the beginning of spell is identified since each aircraft has
multiple operators during its lifetime. If we were considering only the duration of the first operator (i.e.,
when the aircraft is acquired new), clearly the coefficient of Age at the beginning of spell would not be
identified.
37The control function approach requires running a first-step regression of the endogenous variable on the
instrument plus the other explanatory variables, and computing the residuals. In the second step, the hazard
is estimated including the residual from the first step as a regressor. These residuals control for the potential
endogeneity of Airtype and Optype.
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Table 3: Market Thickness and Aircraft Turnover: Hazard Model Estimates of Trading
Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age at the Beginning of Spell
.04451
(.00453)
.04344
(.00448)
.00027
(.00487)
−.00015
(.00479)
Log(Airtype)
.25517
(.09215)
.19042
(.09835)
Log(Optype)
.37810
(.12095)
.33125
(.13469)
Log-Likelihood −136760.3 −136704.9 −132836.8 −132793.8
# Obs 241622 241622 241622 241622
Aircraft 17398 17398 17398 17398
Notes—This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of Cox proportional hazard models that investigate
the effect of market thickness on the probability of trading aircraft. Age at the Beginning of the Spell
is the age of the aircraft (in years) at the time of the acquisition. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a
given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is the total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type in
a given year. Standard errors clustered at the aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations allow the
baseline hazard to vary by aircraft-type. The equations estimated in all columns also contain year fixed effects
(not reported). The equations estimated in columns (3) and (4) additionally contain carrier fixed effects (not
reported).
ber of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the number of years since the release date);
the average number of days of strike per worker in the manufacturing sector in the country of
the aircraft manufacturer and its lags, and the interactions with aircraft characteristics (the
number of seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the number of
years since the release date).
Table 3 presents the results of the second stage. I measure the size of the market with
Airtype in columns (1) and (3), and with Optype in columns (2) and (4). The specification
of columns (1) and (2) does not include carrier fixed effects, while the specification of columns
(3) and (4) includes them. The results indicate that aircraft with a thicker market have
shorter holding durations. These results are robust across the two ways of measuring market
thickness, and to the inclusion of carrier fixed effects. The point estimates mean that an
increase of Airtype by ten percent increases the hazard rate of trading by about 1.9-2.5
percent, a sizable magnitude. Similarly, an increase of Optype by ten percent increases the
hazard rate of trading by about 3.3-3.7 percent. To understand the economic magnitude of
these elasticities, a ten-percent increase in the market thickness of the Boeing 737—the most
popular aircraft—corresponds to about 190 aircraft in the year 1990, and this is similar to the
average annual production of new Boeing 737. Such increase in market thickness decreases
each holding duration by about two to three months. Since the Boeing 737 is the aircraft type
with the thickest market, the elasticities imply that an equivalent increase of 190 aircraft in
the market size of any other aircraft type decreases holding durations by a larger amount—i.e.,
the magnitudes reported for the Boeing 737 are the lowest bound of the magnitudes of all
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aircraft types.38
Overall, the results reported here provides strong evidence in favor of prediction 1: Assets
with a thicker market have higher turnover.
4.5.2 Capacity Utilization
The previous analysis shows that aircraft trade more frequently as their market gets thicker,
suggesting that aircraft with a thinner market are more illiquid. This has potential implica-
tions for the allocation of the assets. In fact, the model implies that aircraft that trade more
frequently are allocated more efficiently. I now investigate another aspect of asset allocations,
testing prediction 2 that capacity utilization of aircraft operators should be higher as the
aircraft market gets thicker.
The theoretical model with endogenous capacity utilization developed in Appendix A indi-
cates that capital utilization is an increasing function of the firm’s underlying productivity, as
other papers in the literature also suggest (e.g., Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996). Moreover,
most of the extensive empirical literature on productivity cannot precisely distinguish produc-
tivity from capacity utilization (see Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967, for an early discussion).
Hence, these theory-driven considerations imply that we can infer something about carriers’
productivity by studying utilization rates, and the link between aircraft Airtype or Optype
and capacity utilization indicates whether assets with a thicker market are more efficiently
allocated. To this end, I estimate equation (1) with Log(fhjkit) as a dependent variable,
where fhjkit is the total annual flying hours of aircraft j of model k type i in year t.
The estimation of equation (1) with Log(fhjkit) as the dependent variable faces a few
econometric challenges, in addition to the ones already outlined in Section 4.4. The first chal-
lenge is that aircraft are frequently parked inactive in the desert. Technically, parked aircraft
imply that the dependent variable is censored at zero. I could deal with this complication
generically—estimating a Tobit model via maximum likelihood—but in the data, censoring
acts in a slightly more subtle way. In particular, all parked aircraft have zero flying hours,
but the non-parked aircraft have flying hours that start at around 1,000 hours per year. This
gap implies that the effects of the independent variables on the extensive and the intensive
margins are likely to be different. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity in the extensive mar-
gin is likely correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in the intensive margin, implying that
E(ǫjkit|Qjkit, fhjkit > 0) 6= 0 and simple regressions on the sample of aircraft with positive
38One potential issue with the previous analysis is the role of replacement purchases of aircraft. If carriers
sell old aircraft when they acquire new ones of the same type, then, mechanically, we would observe more
frequent trading of existing aircraft when more new units of the same type are produced. The quantity-based
measure Airtype includes new units, and, thus, the observed correlation between turnover and Airtype
could be simply due to replacement purchases. In reality, the use of the instruments described in the text
eliminates this concern. Moreover, the evidence reported in Gavazza (2009) shows that aircraft replacement
accounts for a minority of aircraft trades, and most trades are, instead, due to profitability shocks to carriers.
In addition, the observed correlations would still imply that one motive for trade (replacement) is stronger for
more popular aircraft, which is perfectly consistent with the idea put forth in this paper that market thickness
matters for asset allocations and prices. In short, even if all trades were due to replacement, we should still
conclude that replacement is more frequent for more-popular aircraft, indicating that trading frictions are
lower for more-popular aircraft.
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Table 4: Market Thickness and Aircraft Utilization: difference-GMM estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flyjkit Flyjkit Log(fhjkit) Log(fhjkit)
Age
−.01497
(.00232)
−.01279
(.00281)
−.03437
(.00383)
−.03521
(.00361)
Log(Airtype)
.09842
(.04861)
.18996
(.08998)
Log(Optype)
.08586
(.02413)
.09105
(.03845)
# Obs 64279 64279 60139 60139
Aircraft 11596 11596 11240 11240
Notes—This table presents Arellano and Bond GMM estimates of the effect of market thickness on capacity
utilization. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary indicator equal to one if the aircraft
had positive flying hours in a given year, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4)
is the log of annual flying hours. The sample is restricted to aircraft with strictly positive flying hours in the
specifications of columns (3) and (4). Age is the age of the aircraft. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of
a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is the total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type
in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations also
contain year fixed effects (not reported).
flying hours provide inconsistent estimates. However, in practice, all parameters can be con-
sistently recovered using only aircraft with positive flying hours by estimating equation (1) in
the first-difference specification—equation (5). Thus, I estimate two separate equations: one
for the extensive margin, and one for the intensive margin.39
The difference-GMM procedure outlined in section 4.4 relies on the linearity of the estimat-
ing equation. Hence, I use a linear probability model also in the extensive-margin equation,
since the difference-GMM procedure allows me to deal with many econometric complexities.
In particular, in addition to endogeneity issues previously discussed, it is useful to highlight
that the difference-GMM procedure also allows me to difference out any selection effect that
may induce different carriers with different business models (e.g., hub-and-spoke versus point-
to-point; scheduled airlines versus charter airlines) to choose different aircraft types, and affect
the average level of capacity utilization.
Table 4 presents the coefficients of the difference-GMM.40 Columns (1) and (2) present
the results of the extensive-margin equation, and columns (3) and (4) of the intensive margin.
According to the estimates in column (1), a ten-percent increase in Airtype is associated
with a 0.9 percentage point increase in the probability that the aircraft is flying, a considerable
39Aircraft also have a maximum utilization rate, as they cannot fly more than 24 hours per day. However,
in the data, we do not observe any mass point in the upper tail of the utilization distribution, which suggests
that the upper bound is never achieved.
40The number of observations in columns (1) and (2) differs from the number of observations in columns
(3) and (4) because the regressions on the intensive margin (columns (3) and (4)) use only aircraft that have
positive flying hours in periods t and t− 1.
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magnitude. The results reported in column (2) using Optype are very similar: a ten-percent
increase in Optype is associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability that
the aircraft is flying. According to the estimates in column (3), conditional on flying, a ten-
percent increase in Airtype is associated with a 1.9-percent increase in capacity utilization.
The results obtained using Optype in column (4) are slightly smaller: a ten-percent increase
in Optype is associated with a 0.9-percent increase in capacity utilization. These elasticities
imply, for example, that a ten-percent increase in market thickness of the Boeing 737 (either
190 aircraft per type or 17 operators in the year 1990, at the beginning of this sample period)
increases annual flying hours by about 30 to 60 hours, a non-trivial number. As I previously
pointed out, since the Boeing 737 is the aircraft type with the thickest market, the magnitudes
for the Boeing 737 are the lowest bound of the magnitudes for all aircraft types.
Overall, the results support prediction 2 that aircraft capacity utilization increases as
the aircraft market gets thicker. Since the model indicates that capacity utilization and
productivity are directly related (are a one-to-one function), the evidence, thus, suggests that
assets are more efficiently allocated when their market gets thicker.
4.5.3 Dispersion of Capacity Utilization
As highlighted by the discussion in Section 3, the same economic forces that increase capacity
utilization when the market gets thicker imply that the equilibrium dispersions of carriers’
capacity utilization is lower as the asset market gets thicker. Thus, I now turn to the empirical
investigation of the dispersion of utilization rates, directly testing prediction 3.
I analyze the link between the size of the aircraft market and dispersion of capacity uti-
lization, investigating whether the absolute percentage deviation of flying hours
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣
described in subsection 4.2 is lower for aircraft with a thicker market. More precisely, I specify
equation (1) with
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ as the dependent variable. I then employ difference-GMM to
estimate equation (5) with ∆
∣∣∣ fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ as the dependent variable, with instruments for the
potentially endogenous variable market thickness.41 As previously noted, the difference-GMM
procedure is particularly well suited to difference out any selection effect that may induce dif-
ferent carriers with different business models to choose different aircraft types, and generate
dispersion of capacity utilization.
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients. Market size is measured with Airtype in
columns (1) and (3), and with Optype in columns (2) and (4). The negative coefficients
of the market-size variables show that as the aircraft market gets thicker, the dispersion
of capacity utilization decreases. The coefficients reported in column (1) imply that a ten-
percent increase in the stock of aircraft decreases dispersion of utilization by 2.2 percent.
The coefficients reported in column (2) imply that a ten-percent increase in the number
of operators decreases dispersion by approximately one percent. At the average value of the
41I also undertook the same procedure calculating the average for each age a-type i-year t tuple—i.e., fhait,
and using
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhait
fhait
∣∣∣ as a dependent variable. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 5 and,
thus, are omitted.
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Table 5: Market Thickness and Dispersion of Capacity Utilization: difference-GMM esti-
mates
(1) (2) (3) (4)∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣
fhjkit>0
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣
fhjkit>0
Age
.03102
(.00559)
.03717
(.00521)
.01672
(.00267)
.01687
(.00271)
Log(Airtype)
−.22892
(.09246)
−.17437
(.06521)
Log(Optype)
−.10631
(.04163)
−.05421
(.02861)
# Obs 63886 63886 60139 60139
Aircraft 11582 11582 11240 11240
Notes—This table presents Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimates of the effect of market thickness on the
dispersion of capacity utilization. The dependent variable is the absolute percentage deviation of flying hours
of a given aircraft from the average flying hours of all aircraft of the same age and model in the same year. The
equations estimated in specifications (3) and (4) use only observations with strictly positive flying hours. Age
is the age of the aircraft. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype
is the total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the
aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations also contain year fixed effects (not reported).
variables, these elasticities imply that a ten-percent increase in market thickness of the Boeing
737 (either 190 aircraft per type or 17 operators in the year 1990, at the beginning of this
sample period) decreases the absolute value of the deviation of individual annual flying hours
from the mean—i.e., |fhjkit − fhakit|—by about five to ten hours.
In columns (3) and (4), I perform the same regressions as in columns (1) and (2), but I
consider only observations with positive flying hours. More precisely, I calculate the average
fhakit only using observations with fhjkit > 0, and then calculate
∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣
fhjkit>0
. The
reason for this choice is that aircraft with zero flying hours mechanically increase the disper-
sion of utilization levels, and it is instructive to understand whether the dispersion is driven
exclusively by parked aircraft. The coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) show that, as
expected, the magnitude of the effect of market thickness on dispersion is smaller when only
active aircraft are considered. However, the size of the aircraft market still has a considerable
effect: A ten-percent increase in Airtypeit decreases dispersion of utilization by 1.7 percent,
and a ten-percent increase in Optypeit decreases dispersion of utilization by 0.5 percent.
These elasticities imply, for example, that a ten-percent increase in market thickness of the
Boeing 737 (either 190 aircraft per type or 17 operators in the year 1990, at the beginning of
this sample period) decreases the absolute value of the deviation of individual annual flying
hours from the mean—i.e., |fhjkit− fhakit|fhjkit>0—by about two to six hours. Moreover, the
magnitudes for all other aircraft types are larger, since the Boeing 737 is the aircraft type
with the largest market.
These regressions confirm that market thickness affects both the intensive and the extensive
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margins of utilization.42,43
4.6 Results: the Effect of Market Thickness on Aircraft Prices
This subsection investigates the effect of market thickness on asset prices. I present two sets
of results, directly testing predictions 1 and 2 related to the first and second moments of the
cross-sectional price distribution.44
4.6.1 Average Prices
To test prediction 4 on the effect of market thickness on aircraft prices, I specify equation
(1) with log p¯jkit as the dependent variable, where p¯jkit is the Blue Book price of an aircraft
of vintage j model k type i in year t.45 I then estimate the first-difference version (5) with
∆ log p¯jkit as the dependent variable using GMM, instrumenting for the potentially endogenous
variable ∆Log(Airtypeit) and ∆Log(Optypeit).
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients. The table shows that aircraft prices increase as
their market gets thicker, confirming prediction 4. Moreover, the magnitude of the economic
effect is sizable: A ten-percent increase in Airtype is associated with a 2.7-percent increase
in the price of the aircraft. This magnitude is equivalent to the effect on price of around six
months of Age. Similarly, a ten-percent increase in Optype is associated with a 2.0-percent
increase in the price of the aircraft. To get a better sense of the economic significance of the
results, these elasticities imply that the price of a new Boeing 737 aircraft—whose average
price was approximately 36 million dollars in 1990—increases by approximately 700,000 to
970,000 dollars after a one-off ten-percent increase in its market size Boeing 737 (either 190
42I have also employed a second empirical strategy that follows directly from the previous analysis of the
effect of market thickness on the level of capacity utilization. More precisely, based on the estimates reported
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, I obtain the residuals ǫˆjkit of the utilization equation. I then calculate the
variance Var(ǫˆjIt) of these residuals for each type-year pair, and I regress Var(ǫˆjIt) on the corresponding
measure of market thickness Log(Airtype) or Log(Optype), aircraft-type fixed effects and year fixed effects.
The results confirm that aircraft with a thicker market have a lower variance Var(ǫˆjIt), which corroborates
the results reported in Table 5.
43A potential concern with the regressions in Table 5 is that the dependent variable has the average utilization
in the denominator, and the regressions reported in Table 5 indicate that average utilization increases as the
asset market gets thicker. Hence, to check the robustness of the results, I have run all regressions with∣∣fhjkit − fhakit∣∣ as the dependent variable. The results are robust to this alternative way of measuring
dispersion.
44The regression reported in the subsequent Tables 6 and 7 are designed to investigate how market thickness
affects the first and second moment of the cross-sectional distribution of prices—i.e., the level and dispersion
of prices. A related question is how market thickness affects the time-series of prices—i.e., the volatility of
prices. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2007) show that shocks have a bigger effects on prices when search
frictions are larger. To investigate this issue, I run a regression similar to equation (1) with |∆ log p¯jkit| as the
dependent variable—i.e., the absolute value of the difference between the (log of the) Blue Book price p¯jkit of
an aircraft of vintage j model k type i in year t and the (log of the) price p¯jkit−1 of the same aircraft—i.e.,
same vintage j model k type i—in year t − 1. The regressions (available from the author) confirm that the
volatility of aircraft prices decreases as their market gets thicker, providing further evidence on the empirical
importance of trading frictions due to market thinness. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this
point.
45Note that the panel variable is, thus, a model-vintage pair. I have also estimated the price equation using
model-age as a panel variable. The results are identical and, thus, are omitted.
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Table 6: Market Thickness and Aircraft Prices: difference-GMM estimates
Log(p¯jkit) (1) (2)
Age
−.01326
(.01862)
−.03776
(.01439)
Log(Airtype)
.27736
(.1418)
Log(Optype)
.20668
(.08842)
# Obs 4398 4398
Aircraft (Vintage-Model) 332 332
Notes—This table presents Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimates of the effect of market thickness on aircraft
prices. The dependent variable is the log of the deflated aircraft price. Age is the age of the aircraft. Airtype
is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is the total number of carriers
operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the aircraft-type–year level in
parentheses. All equations also contain year fixed effects (not reported)
aircraft per type or 17 operators in the year 1990). Since the Boeing 737 is the aircraft type
with the thickest market, the prices of all other aircraft types increase by an even larger
amount after the same absolute increase in the size of the market.
4.6.2 Price Dispersion
The previous results showed that there exists a clear parallel between the increase in the level of
capacity utilization and the increase in the level of aircraft prices as the market gets thicker.
I now investigate if the same parallel exists for dispersion. In particular, the dispersion of
transaction prices should be the mirror image of the dispersion of utilization levels previously
documented. Thus, I now test prediction 5 on the effect of market thickness on the dispersion
of transaction prices.
As reported in subsection 4.1, I measure price dispersion using the absolute percentage
deviation
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ of the transaction price from the Blue Book price, where pjkit is the
transaction price of aircraft j of age Agejkit = a model k type i in year t, and p¯akit is the
Blue Book price of aircraft of age a model k type i in year t. Figure 1 showed that the two
price series are highly correlated, so that
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ seems a reasonable way to measure the
dispersion of transaction prices.
It is instructive to have a sense of the data by simply looking at the empirical distributions
of
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ corresponding to values of market thickness of Airtype above and below the
median: Figure 3 plots these two empirical distributions (The figure using Optype is very
similar). The solid line is the empirical c.d.f. of absolute percentage deviation
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣
when the corresponding value of Airtype is above the sample median, while the dotted line
is the empirical c.d.f. of the same variable when Airtype is below the sample median. The
comparison of the two empirical distributions in Figure 3 clearly shows that the dispersion of
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Fig. 3: Empirical distributions of deviations of transaction price from Blue Book price for above-
and below-median liquidity.
transaction prices is higher for aircraft with a thicker market. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
clearly rejects equality of two distributions (the p-value is 1.7422× 10−6).
In order to investigate more formally the effects of market thickness on the dispersion of
transaction prices, I estimate equation (1) using the absolute percentage deviation
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣
as the dependent variable. As the dependent variable is based on transaction prices, no panel-
data are available, and the difference-GMM procedure cannot be used. Thus, I can simply
instrument market thickness using the instruments described in section 4.4: cumulative pro-
duction in year t − 5; the stock of aircraft of the same type produced more than 25 years
ago; the (deflated) price of aluminum and its lags, interacted with aircraft characteristics
(the number of seats, the number of engines, the maximum take-off weight, and the number
of years since the release date); and the average number of days of strike per worker in the
manufacturing sector in the country of the aircraft manufacturer and its lags, and their inter-
actions with aircraft characteristics (the number of seats, the number of engines, the maximum
take-off weight, and the number of years since the release date). As already highlighted, this
IV strategy is a weaker procedure than difference-GMM. Nonetheless, the use of very distant
lags of cumulative production reduces endogeneity concerns to a minimum, and the other
supply-side instruments are clearly uncorrelated with demand-side shocks.
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients. The table clearly shows that the dispersion
of transaction prices is lower for aircraft with a thicker market, thus verifying prediction 5.
According to the estimates, a ten-percent increase in Airtype is associated with a 1.3-1.5-
percent decrease in the absolute value of the percentage difference between transaction price
and Blue Book price. Similarly, a ten-percent increase in Optype is associated with a 1.0-1.1-
percent decrease in the absolute value of the percentage difference between transaction price
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Table 7: Market Thickness and Aircraft Price Dispersion: IV estimates
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
.00179
(.00365)
.00265
(.00377)
.00285
(.00595)
.00393
(.00618)
Log(Airtype)
−.13635
(.04372)
−.15692
(.04116)
Log(Optype)
−.10401
(.04365)
−.11208
(.04204)
R2 .419 .413 .494 .486
# Obs 1570 1570 1570 1570
Notes—This table presents IV estimates of the effect of market thickness on the dispersion of transaction
prices. The dependent variable is the absolute percentage deviation of the transaction price of a given aircraft
from the Blue Book price of an aircraft of the same age and model in the same year. Age is the age of
the aircraft. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Optype is
the total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard errors clustered at
the aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations also contain year fixed effects (not reported). The
equation estimated in columns (1) and (2) also contains aircraft-model, year and noise-stage fixed effects (not
reported). The equation estimated in columns (3) and (4) also contains aircraft-model, year, noise-stage and
engine-type fixed effects (not reported).
and Blue Book price. These elasticities imply that a ten-percent increase in market thickness
of the Boeing 737 (either 190 aircraft per type or 17 operators in the year 1990, towards the
end of this sample period) decreases the absolute value of the deviation of the transaction
price from the Blue Book price—i.e., |pjkit − p¯akit|—by about 22,000 to 33,000 dollars. Again,
since the Boeing 737 is the aircraft type with the thickest market, these magnitudes represent
the lowest bound on the decrease in the dispersion of prices following an equivalent increase
in the absolute size of the market.46,47
4.7 Robustness Checks and Alternative Hypotheses
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that trading frictions are lower for more-
popular aircraft. The results suggest that aircraft become more “liquid” as their market
gets thicker, increasing the lower bound of operators’ equilibrium productivity levels and
resulting in higher utilization rates, as well as less dispersion of capacity utilization rates. In
turn, the effects of market thickness on utilization transmit to prices, increasing the average
46Similar to the remark in footnote 43, a potential concern with the regressions of Table 7 is that the
dependent variable has the average price in the denominator, and the regressions reported in Table 7 indicate
that the average price increases as the asset market gets thicker. Hence, to check the robustness of the results,
I have run all regressions with |pjkit − p¯akit| as the dependent variable. The results (unreported) are robust
to this alternative way of measuring price dispersion.
47It may seem puzzling that, in some tables, the coefficients of Airtype are larger in absolute value than
the coefficients of Optype, while, in others, the opposite is true. As emphasized in Section 4.1, it is important
to remember that, sometimes, the data used in the different regressions correspond to different time periods.
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level and decreasing the dispersion of transaction prices. Moreover, the richness of the data
allowed me to control for a number of unobservable factors that could have made it difficult to
cleanly identify the effect of market thickness on prices and allocations. The use of difference-
GMM and instruments excludes the possibility that the quantity-based measures Airtype or
Optype capture the effect of unobserved demand shocks.48
This Section reports on robustness checks that control for the role of leasing and for
carriers’ financial positions. Finally, it discusses alternative hypotheses that focus on resale
costs, and on observed or unobserved quality differences across aircraft. The analysis confirms
and strengthens the previous findings.
4.7.1 The Role of Leasing
Gavazza (2009) documents that the role of aircraft leasing has increased rapidly since the
mid-1980s, up to the point that, in the year 2003, about half of all commercial aircraft were
leased. Gavazza (2010) further shows that aircraft with a thicker market are more likely to
be leased. Thus, a natural question is whether the previously documented empirical patterns
of the effects of market thickness on allocations and prices are robust to the inclusion of
additional variables that control for the number of leased aircraft across aircraft types and
years.
To investigate this issue, from the Aircraft History database, I construct the number of
aircraft leased for each type i year t, Airtype leasedit. Then, I re-estimate most of the
specifications in Tables 3-7 with this additional control variable. To save space, I report in
Table 8 only the specifications that use Airtype as a measure of market thickness.
Table 8 shows that the results are robust to this potential concern. The magnitudes of
the coefficients of Log(Airtype) in Table 8 are very similar to the magnitudes reported in
Tables 3-7. Surprisingly, the signs of the coefficients of Log(Airtype leased) are opposite
of the signs of the coefficients of Log(Airtype), although they are often insignificant. In
particular, the coefficients of Log(Airtype leased) indicate that a larger number of leased
aircraft does not systematically generate direct spillovers to other aircraft of the same type.49
48For example, consider resale costs that vary across aircraft types and over time. An unobserved increase in
the level of these resale costs could simulatenously decrease aircraft demand (and, thus, Airtype), and lower
turnover, capacity utilization and prices. The empirical model addresses these demand shocks explicitly in the
following way. Aircraft type-specific resale costs are factors that go into the unobservable ǫjit of equation (1).
Substracting the lagged endogenous variable removes the persistent component of the unobservable (equation
(4)), leaving only the current period innovation in the unobservable νjit (i.e., the innovation in resale costs from
period t − 1 to period t). Taking first-differences further removes the fixed effect (1− ρ) ζi. The differenced
innovation ∆νjit could be correlated with changes in market thickness, thus instruments are required. The
supply-side instruments listed in Section 4.4 are plausibly predetermined at the time the innovation to the
current period unobservable is realized, such as the innovation/change in resale costs from period t − 1 to
period t. Hence, the empirical results are unlikely to be due to demand factors, like changes in resale costs.
49The results reported in Table 8 are not inconsistent with the empirical results in Gavazza (2009), that
shows that leased aircraft trade more frequently and fly more, suggesting that trading frictions are lower on
leased aircraft than on owned aircraft. In particular, Table 8 investigates whether leased aircraft generate
spillovers to other aircraft, while Gavazza (2009) investigates cross-sectional differences between leased and
owned aircraft. First-differencing the data eliminates these cross-sectional differences in Table 8.
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Table 8: Robustness Check I: the Role of Leasing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
hjkit (s) Flyjkit Log(fhjkit)
∣∣∣ fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣fhjkit−fhakit
fhakit
∣∣∣
fhjkit>0
Log(p¯jkit)
∣∣∣pjkit−p¯akitp¯akit
∣∣∣
Age
.04247
(.00410)
−.01591
(.00214)
−.03321
(.00420)
.03913
(.00485)
.01931
(.00207)
−.03441
(.01605)
.00293
(.00277)
Log(Airtype)
.57798
(.24396)
.11515
(.04256)
.23179
(.07137)
−.11944
(.05541)
−.07478
(.03767)
.17021
(.09234)
−.18889
(.06215)
Log(Airtype leased)
−.22148
(.16254)
−.02962
(.01226)
−.01146
(.02149)
.03692
(.01220)
.02350
(.00957)
−.06856
(.03536)
.04671
(.03152)
# Obs 241622 64279 60139 63886 60139 4398 1570
Aircraft 17398 11596 11240 11582 11240 332 1570
Notes—This table presents the results of robustness checks on the role of leasing. Column (1) reports the estimates of a Cox proportional hazard model,
equivalent to specification (1) of Table 3. Columns (2) and (3) report Arellano and Bond GMM estimates equivalent to specifications (1) and (3) in Table 4.
Columns (4) and (5) report Arellano and Bond GMM estimates equivalent to specifications (1) and (3) in Table 5. Column (6) reports Arellano and Bond
GMM estimates equivalent to specification (1) in Table 6. Column (7) reports IV estimates equivalent to specification (3) in Table 7. Airtype is the total
stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations also contain
year fixed effects (not reported).
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4.7.2 Carriers’ Financial Position
In an insightful paper, Pulvino (1998) investigates the determinants of aircraft transaction
prices and finds that carriers in worse financial conditions sell aircraft at bigger discounts.
Two key predictions of the theoretical framework of my paper are that sellers’ profitabilities
are endogenously lower when assets have a thinner market, and that the dispersion of trans-
action prices is endogenously bigger for assets with a thinner market. Clearly, firms’ financial
conditions and profitabilities are very closely related—economic and financial distress are of-
ten two sides of the same coin—and the dispersion of transaction prices is also very closely
related to price discounts. Hence, my paper elucidates Pulvino’s results by describing an eco-
nomic mechanism that simultaneously implies that sellers are, on average, in worse financial
condition and that price discounts are bigger when aircraft have a thinner market. In light
of Pulvino’s results, I now perform an additional robustness check by investigating whether
carriers in worse financial conditions also have lower capacity utilization.
Unfortunately, the dataset described in Section 4.1 does not report any operators’ finan-
cial information. However, U.S. carriers (publicly-listed and privately-owned) with annual
operating revenues of $20 million or more are required to report their operating balance sheet
statements on a quarterly basis to the Department of Transportation. These statements (Form
41) are available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov. Thus, I follow Pulvino (1998) and use
the Leverage ratio (defined as book value of debt plus capitalized lease obligations divided
by the sum of book value of debt, capitalized lease obligations and book value of equity) and
the Current ratio (defined as current assets divided by current liabilities) as measures of
an operator’s financial position. To match these financial ratios to annual aircraft utilization,
I use financial data for the fourth quarter of each year, and I include in the sample only
aircraft that have been operated by a U.S. carrier for the entire year (thus, aircraft acquired
or relinquished by a U.S. carrier are excluded in the year when the transactions occurred).
Table 9 reports the results of several specifications that include carriers’ financial positions
as explanatory variables. Columns (1) and (2) presents the results for the intensive-margin
equation of whether to fly the aircraft or not. Columns (3) to (4) presents the results for
the extensive-margin equation of how many hours to fly the aircraft. Odd-numbered columns
use Log(Airtype) as the measure of market thickness, and even-numbered columns use
Log(Optype). All regressions are equivalent to the regressions reported in Table 4, with
only the difference that they include carriers’ financial ratios and, thus, are also restricted
to U.S. operators. In all regressions, the measures of market thickness Log(Airtype) and
Log(Optype) are instrumented with the same instruments described in Section 4.4.
The Table shows that the results on the effects of market thickness on capacity utilization
are robust to the inclusion of carriers’ financial ratios. Carriers’ leverage ratio is negatively
correlated with capacity utilization. Instead, the current ratio does not add any significant
explanatory power to the regressions. Overall, these regressions confirm that market thickness
has important effects on aircraft allocations. They also reinforce the idea that firms’ financial
conditions and productivities are closely related, although the direction of causality between
productivity and financial conditions is difficult to establish in these regressions.
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Table 9: Robustness Check II: Carriers’ Financial Position and Aircraft Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flyjkit Flyjkit Log(fhjkit) Log(fhjkit)
Age
−.00747
(.00245)
−.03422
(.00297)
−.02900
(.00804)
−.03469
(.00920)
Leverage ratio
−.01474
(.00747)
.01718
(.00615)
−.07965
(.01595)
−.07240
(.01862)
Current ratio
−.00118
(.00131)
.01202
(.00239)
.00447
(.00787)
−.00235
(.00945)
Log(Airtype)
.07934
(.03984)
.26031
(.13363)
Log(Optype)
.07800
(.01226)
.15076
(.04251)
# Obs 29566 29566 28343 28343
Aircraft 6320 6320 6210 6210
Notes—This table presents Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimates of the effect of market thickness and carriers’
financial position on capacity utilization. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary indicator
equal to one if the aircraft had positive flying hours in a given year, and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log of annual flying hours. The sample is restricted to aircraft with
strictly positive flying hours in the specifications of columns (3) and (4). Age is the age of the aircraft. The
Leverage ratio is equal to the book value of debt plus capitalized lease obligations divided by the sum of
book value of debt, capitalized lease obligations and book value of equity. The Current ratio is equal to
current assets divided by current liabilities. Airtype is the total stock of aircraft of a given aircraft type in a
given year. Optype is the total number of carriers operating a given aircraft type in a given year. Standard
errors clustered at the aircraft-type–year level in parentheses. All equations also contain year fixed effects (not
reported).
4.7.3 Observable Quality
The literature on durable goods highlights the role of depreciation (quality differentials) in
explaining patterns of trade and makes different predictions if parties have symmetric versus
asymmetric information on the depreciation (quality) of the asset. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999),
Porter and Sattler (1999) and Stolyarov (2002) predict that, under symmetric information,
lower-quality goods: 1) trade more frequently; and 2) command lower prices. Clearly, these
predictions are inconsistent with the fact that assets with a thicker market trade more fre-
quently and command higher prices. Thus, theories of quality differentials under symmetric
information cannot explain the observed patterns.
In addition, a faster improvement in new goods is theoretically equivalent to a faster
depreciation rate, since we can rescale all available qualities in terms of the highest available
quality in the market. Thus, the same theoretical considerations discussed by Hendel and
Lizzeri (1999), Porter and Sattler (1999) and Stolyarov (2002) apply to a model with different
rates of innovations across assets. In particular, a model in which assets with a thicker market
exhibit a faster rate of product innovation (and, thus, higher turnover) cannot explain the
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empirical results.
4.7.4 Unobservable Quality
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) show that, under asymmetric information, durable goods with
higher information asymmetries: 1) trade less frequently; and 2) command lower prices.
Moreover, any asymmetric-information model implies that goods with more-severe informa-
tion asymmetries exhibit a lower dispersion of transaction prices, as transaction prices do not
depend on unobserved quality differences. Several institutional features of the aircraft market,
and a close look at the data show that asymmetric information is unlikely to account for all
observed patterns.
First, the aviation authorities regulate aircraft maintenance: After an aircraft has flown
a certain number of hours, carriers undertake compulsory maintenance. This suggests that
quality differences cannot be too high. Moreover, Pulvino (1998) rejects the hypothesis that,
conditional on observable characteristics such as age, quality differentials between aircraft
explain trade patterns. Furthermore, maintenance records are readily available, and all parties
can observe the entire history of each aircraft. This suggests that asymmetries of information
cannot be too strong. Second, it is important to reiterate that panel data techniques mean
that the effect of market thickness on prices is identified from variations in market thickness
through the life of a given vintage-type combination, and the effect of market thickness on
utilization is identified from variations in market thickness through the life of a given aircraft
serial number. Thus, if the patterns were explained by asymmetries of information, then we
would have to conclude that the quality of a given vintage (of a given serial number) improves
over its lifespan in the case of prices (in the case of utilization), which seems very unlikely. In
the specific case of prices, moreover, it is not clear why such improvements over the life of the
vintage are not capitalized immediately in prices. Third, the aforementioned predictions of
models with asymmetric informations are inconsistent with the fact that assets with a thinner
market trade less frequently, command lower prices, and exhibit a higher price dispersion.
In summary, these reasonable alternative hypotheses (and several others) do not explain all
empirical patterns documented. Therefore, I conclude that trading frictions vary with market
thickness, and that they have considerable effects on allocations and prices in the market for
capital equipment, as predicted by the theoretical framework.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have investigated whether trading frictions vary with the size of the asset
market. I set up a model of a bilateral search market to investigate what implications market
thickness has for asset allocations and prices. The key economic mechanism is that the trading
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, so that, as the mass of assets increases, the
flow of meetings increases more than proportionally. As a result, assets with a thicker market:
1) trade more frequently; 2) have higher average capacity utilizations; 3) have lower dispersion
37
of capacity utilization levels; 4) fetch higher average prices; and 5) have lower dispersion of
transaction prices.
Detailed microdata on assets allow a study of the workings of one specific decentralized
market, the market for commercial aircraft. The empirical analysis uncovers a number of
robust empirical findings, confirming all predictions of the theoretical framework. A ten-
percent increase in the stock of aircraft of a given type implies: 1) a 1.9-percent increase in
the hazard of trading the aircraft; 2) a 1.9-percent increase in the average capacity utilization;
3) a 2.2-percent decrease in the absolute percentage deviation of utilizations from the mean
utilization; 4) a 2.7-percent increase in the average price; and 5) a 1.5-percent decrease in the
absolute percentage deviation of transaction prices from the mean price.
This paper shows that the thickness of the asset market reduces frictions in input markets,
thereby increasing the aggregate efficiency of output markets. Aircraft are among the easiest
assets to redeploy across users. Nonetheless, differences between aircraft with a thin market
and a thick market are still non-negligible. These differences indicate that market thinness
acts like a sunk cost of investment, and the literature on irreversible investment finds that
sunk costs have a first-order effect on firms’ investment decisions. Abel and Eberly (1996)
show that even small degrees of irreversibility matter a lot for establishment-level dynamics.
However, the aggregate effects of irreversibility are more ambiguous. For example, Veracierto
(2002) suggests that investment irreversibilities do not play a significant role for aggregate
fluctuations. This paper does not consider aggregate shocks and aggregate fluctuations, but
finds that one aggregate effect of the expansion of asset markets is to raise the equilibrium
efficiency of the firms that operate these assets. In this sense, market thinness acts, here, in
much the same way as the entry cost in the general equilibrium models of Hopenhayn (1992)
and Asplund and Nocke (2006), and as the cost of firing labor in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993).
The mechanism identified in this paper potentially applies to the economy as a whole.
Investigating whether the market for corporate assets has become larger and more liquid over
time, and whether this has affected aggregate productivity, seems an interesting question for
future research.
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APPENDICES (Not for Publication)
A Model
In this section, I lay out a model of a decentralized market with two-sided search (Mortensen
and Wright, 2002) to theoretically investigate the effects of market thickness on asset alloca-
tions and prices. As in the recent literature on search in financial markets, the model adapts
the framework introduced by Diamond’s (1982) seminal paper.
I model frictions of reallocating assets explicitly. In particular, each agent contacts another
agent randomly, and this is costly for two reasons: 1) there is an explicit search cost c that
an agent pays in order to actively meet another (random) active agent; and 2) there is a time
cost in that all agents discount future values by the discount rate r > 0.
A.1 Assumptions
Time is continuous and the horizon infinite. There are a total mass S ′ > 0 of assets (i.e., the
thickness of the asset market), and a mass A = S ′ + B′ of agents, with B′ > S ′. All agents
are risk-neutral and discount the future at the positive rate r > 0.
Agents are differentiated by the exogenous productivity parameter z ≥ 0. The exogenous
productivity z is distributed in the population according to the cumulative distribution func-
tion F (z) and follows an independent stochastic process: Each agent receives a new draw
from F (z) at the instantaneous rate λ
Each agent can own either zero or one asset.50 An agent z who owns an asset chooses
the endogenous utilization h of the asset to maximize the instantaneous payoff given by the
difference between revenue zh and costs h
2
2
from operating the asset:
π (z) = max
h
zh−
h
2
2
.
Hence, the optimal capacity utilization is equal to productivity (i.e., h∗ = z), and π (z) = 1
2
z2
are the instantaneous profits.51
Agents can trade assets, and an agent who wants to trade an asset pays a search cost c.
An agent who wants to trade makes contacts with other traders pairwise independently at
Poisson arrival times with intensity γ > 0. Given a contact, because of the random-matching
assumption, the probability that a buyer (seller) makes contact with a seller (buyer) is S (B),
where S and B are the stocks of active sellers and active buyers. In other words, the mass of
50Hence, I do not consider quantity decisions, like Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005 and 2007), Miao
(2006), Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Weill (2007 and 2008). It will be clear that
the intuition applies more generally. See Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) for a model that considers quantity
decisions.
51Under more general forms of complementarity between productivity z and capacity utilization h, the
optimal capacity utilization is still an increasing function of productivity.
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active sellers S (active buyers B) is the subset of the mass of potential sellers S ′ (potential
buyers B′) that has paid the search cost c. Thus, conditional on making contact, all traders
are “equally likely” to be contacted. On aggregate, contacts between sellers and buyers occur
continually at a total (almost sure) rate of γBS.
Once an active buyer and an active seller meet, they negotiate a price to trade. I assume
that an active buyer and an active seller negotiate a price according to generalized Nash
bargaining, where θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the bargaining power of the buyer.
A.2 Solution
The potential seller of an aircraft with productivity z can put it up for sale or keep operating
it. In the former case, he pays the search cost c and meets potential trading partners at rate
γB. In the latter case, he enjoys the flow profit π (z). Similarly, a potential buyer can pay
the search cost c and meet active sellers at rate γS, or can wait to search later when his
profitability changes. We, thus, have four categories of agents: active and non-active buyers
and sellers. I denote by VB (z) the value function of an active buyer, and by WB (z) the value
function of a non-active buyer. Similarly, VS (z) and WS (z) are the value functions of an
active and non-active seller, respectively.
Intuitively, a potential buyer prefers to be an active buyer when his productivity z is suf-
ficiently high, and a potential seller prefers to be an active seller when her productivity is
sufficiently low. Moreover, an active buyer that has just bought an aircraft does not immedi-
ately become (i.e., before z changes) an active seller since he would have been better off not
buying the aircraft and not paying the search cost. Thus, when an active buyer and active
seller meet and trade, they become a non-active seller and a non-active buyer, respectively.
I now derive formally the value functions for active and inactive agents, and the transaction
prices at which trade occurs. These value functions allow me to pin down the equilibrium
conditions and to characterize the endogenous distribution of productivities and capacity
utilizations of active firms and the endogenous distribution of transaction prices.
Numerical solutions shows that the key element affecting the first two moments of the
productivity/capacity utilization and transaction price distributions is how potential sellers’
and buyers’ cutoff values—the values at which potential sellers and buyers are indifferent
between being active or inactive—change with the thickness of the market—that is, with S ′.
In particular, the higher the sellers’ cutoff value and the lower the buyers’ cutoff value, the
higher is the average and the lower is the variance of potential sellers’ productivity. A higher
average z, then, translates into a higher average transaction price, and a lower variance of
valuation into a lower variance of transaction prices. In turn, sellers’ and buyers’ cutoff values
are determined by the (endogenous) total number of meetings γBS.
As spelled out in more detail in Section 3, the key economic force is that the trading
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Hence, sellers’ reservation value increases
and buyers’ reservation value decreases as the asset market gets thicker. In turn, as the
mass of assets increases: 1) assets have a higher turnover; 2) the average productivity z and
average capacity utilization h of firms increase; 3) the dispersion of firms’ productivity and
the dispersion of firms’ capacity utilizations decrease; 4) assets have a higher average price;
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and 5) assets have a lower dispersion of transaction prices.
A.2.1 Value Functions
Consider an agent with productivity b and no asset. The agent can choose to pay the search
cost c and search, or he can decide to stay inactive.
If the agent decides to be an active buyer, his value function VB (b) satisfies
rVB (b) = −c + γS
∫
max {WS (b)− p (b, s)− VB (b) , 0} dGS (s)
+λ
∫
(max {VB (z) ,WB (z)} − VB (b)) dF (z) (A1)
where GS (s) is the endogenous equilibrium distribution of active sellers (which is derived
below). Equation (A1) has the usual interpretation of an asset-pricing equation. An active
buyer with productivity b pays the search cost c. At any date, at most, one of two possible
events might happen to him: 1) At rate γS, he meets an active seller. If he trades, he becomes
an inactive seller and, thus, obtains a capital gain equal to WS (b) − p (b, s) − VB (b). If he
doesn’t trade, he has no capital gain. 2) At rate λ, he receives a new productivity draw. After
learning his new productivity, he decides whether to remain an active buyer (in which case
he has a capital gain/loss equal to VB (z)− VB (b)) or to become an inactive buyer (in which
case he has a capital gain/loss equal to WB (z)− VB (b)).
Similarly, the value function VS (s) of an active seller with productivity s satisfies the
following Bellman equation:
rVS (s) = −c+ π (s) + γB
∫
max {p (b, s) +WB (s)− VS (s) , 0} dGB (b)
+λ
∫
(max {VS (z) ,WS (z)} − VS (s)) dF (z) . (A2)
where GB (b) is the endogenous equilibrium distribution of active buyers (which, again, is
derived below). The interpretation of equation (A2) is now straightforward. An active seller
receives an instantaneous payoff flow equal to the difference between her profitability π (s)
and the search cost c. At rate γB, she meets an active buyer. If she trades, she obtains a
capital gain equal to p (b, s) +WB (s)− VS (s). If she does not trade, she has no capital gain.
At rate λ, she receives a new productivity draw. After learning her new productivity, she
decides whether to remain an active seller (in which case she has a capital gain/loss equal to
VS (z)−VS (s)) or to become an inactive seller (in which case she has a capital gain/loss equal
to WS (z)− VS (s)).
The value functions WB and WS (s) of an inactive buyer and of an inactive seller with
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productivity s satisfy:
rWB = λ
∫
(max {VB (z) ,WB} −WB) dF (z) (A3)
rWS (s) = π (s) + λ
∫
(max {VS (z) ,WS (z)} −WS (s)) dF (z) . (A4)
Equations (A3) and (A4) say that the flow value of an inactive trader is equal to the instan-
taneous profits (0 for a buyer, π (s) for a seller) plus the expected capital gain/loss. Thus, the
value of an inactive buyer is independent of his profitability.
When an active buyer b and an active seller s meet, if they trade, the negotiated price
p (b, s) = θ (VS (s)−WB) + (1− θ) (WS (b)− VB (b)) (A5)
is the solution to the following symmetric-information bargaining problem:52
max
p
[WS (b)− p− VB (b)]
θ [p+WB − VS (s)]
1−θ
subject to: WS (b)− p ≥ VB (b) and p+WB ≥ VS (s) .
Using the equilibrium price (A5), the value function of an active buyer b becomes
rVB (b) + c = γSθ
∫
max {−VS (s) +WB +WS (b)− VB (b) , 0} dGS (s)
+λ
∫
(max {VB (z) ,WB (z)} − VB (b)) dF (z) . (A6)
Similarly, a value function of an active seller s is:
rVS (s) + c = π (s) + γB (1− θ)
∫
max {−VS (s) +WB +WS (b)− VB (b) , 0} dGB (b)
+λ
∫
(max {VS (z) ,WS (z)} − VS (s)) dF (z) . (A7)
Since VB (b) is increasing in b, there exists a reservation value RB such that only buyers
with productivity b ≥ RB (and, hence, profits π (b) ≥ π (RB)) have positive gains from trade.
RB satisfies
VB (RB) =
λ
∫
(max {VB (z) ,WB}) dF (z)
r + λ
.
Similarly, there exists reservation value RS such that only sellers with productivity s ≤ RS
(profits π (s) ≤ π (RS)) have positive gains from trade. RS satisfies
VS (RS) =
π (RS) + λ
∫
max {VS (z) ,WS (z)} dF (z)
r + λ
.
52The characteristics of aircraft markets described in Section 2 support the assumption of symmetric infor-
mation.
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It is easy to show that for c sufficiently large, RB > RS.
When r is small, −VS (s) + VB (s) + VS (b)− VB (b) ≥ 0 for all possible meetings of active
buyers and sellers (Mortensen and Wright, 2002). Moreover, ∂VB(x)
∂pi(x)
satisfies
(r + λ + γSθ)
∂VB (x)
∂π (x)
=
γSθ
r + λ
.
Similarly, ∂VS(x)
∂pi(x)
satisfies
∂VS (x)
∂π (x)
=
1
r + λ+ γB (1− θ)
.
Thus, both VB (x) and VS (x) are linear in π (x) , with slopes given by
∂VB(x)
∂pi(x)
and ∂VS(x)
∂pi(x)
,
respectively. Furthermore, we can use the conditions on the marginal traders VS (RS) and
VB (RB) to find the intercepts. Thus, we can rewrite the value function of an active buyer as
VB (b) = kB (π (b)− π (RB)) +
λ
∫
max {VB (z) ,WB} dF (z)
r + λ
(A8)
where kB =
γSθ
(r+λ)(r+λ+γSθ)
. Similarly, the value function of an active seller is
VS (s) = kS (π (s)− π (RS)) +
π (RS) + λ
∫
max {VS (z) ,WS (z)} dF (z)
r + λ
(A9)
where kS =
1
r+λ+γB(1−θ)
. Thus, the transaction price when seller s and buyer b meet is equal
to:
p (b, s) = θ
(
kS (π (s)− π (RS)) +
π (RS)
r + λ
)
+ (1− θ)
(
π (b)
r + λ
− kB (π (b)− π (RB))
)
+∫
RS
λπ (z)
r (r + λ)
dF (z) +
λ
r
∫ RS (
kS (π (z)− π (RS)) +
π (RS)
r + λ
)
dF (z)−∫
RB
λkB (π (z)− π (RB))
r
dF (z) . (A10)
A.2.2 Distributions of Buyers and Sellers
I now derive the endogenous equilibrium distribution of potential buyers B′ and potential
sellers S ′ and the endogenous distribution of active buyers B and active sellers S.
Let gS′ (·, t) and gB′ (·, t) be the distributions of potential sellers and potential buyers,
respectively. Consider a small interval of time of length ǫ. Up to terms in o (ǫ) , the distribution
of potential sellers gS′ (·, t) evolves from time t to time t+ ǫ according to:
gS′ (z, t + ǫ) =


γS B
′
S′
ǫgB′ (z, t) + λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ) gS′ (z, t) for RB ≤ z
λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ) gS′ (z, t) for RS ≤ z < RB
λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ− γBǫ) gS′ (z, t) for z < RS.
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Similarly, the distribution of potential buyers gB (·, t) evolves over time according to:
gB′ (z, t + ǫ) =


λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ− γSǫ) gB′ (z, t) for RB ≤ z
λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ) gB′ (z, t) for RS ≤ z < RB
γB S
′
B′
ǫgS′ (z, t) + λǫf (z, t) + (1− λǫ) gB′ (z, t) for z < RS.
Steady state requires that traders’ flows for each interval of the distribution functions of
potential buyers B′ and potential sellers S ′ are equal to traders’ flows out. Thus, rearranging
and taking the limit for ǫ→ 0, the endogenous distribution of potential sellers S ′ satisfies
gS′ (z) =


B′
S′
γS
λ+γS
f (z) + f (z) for RB ≤ z
f (z) for RS ≤ z < RB
λ
λ+γB
f (z) for z < RS.
Similarly, the endogenous distribution of potential buyers satisfies
gB′ (z) =


λ
λ+γS
f (z) for RB ≤ z
f (z) for RS ≤ z < RB
S′
B′
γB
λ+γB
f (z) + f (z) for z < RS.
Hence, the distribution of active sellers is
gS (z) =
{
0 for RS ≤ z
f(z)
F (RS)
for z < RS
(A11)
and of active buyers is
gB (z) =
{
f(z)
1−F (RB)
for RB ≤ z
0 for z < RB.
(A12)
A.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions determine the four endogenous variables (RS, RB, S, B) .
Definition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a set of reservation values (RS, RB) , and a stock
of active buyers and sellers (B, S) satisfying the following conditions:
1. The reservation values (RS, RB) satisfy the following indifference conditions:
53
c = γSθ
∫ (
kS (π (RS)− π (s))−
π (RS)− π (RB)
r + λ
)
dGS (s) (A13)
c = γB (1− θ)
∫ (
π (b)− π (RS)
r + λ
− kB (π (b)− π (RB))
)
dGB (b) (A14)
53The conditions are obtained by combining equations (A6), (A8) and (A3), and equations (A7), (A9) and
(A4), respectively.
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where GS (s) and GB (b) are the cumulative distribution functions of active sellers and
active buyers, respectively. GS (s) and GB (b) are derived from the probability density
functions gS (s) and gB (b) defined in (A11) and (A12);
2. Active buyers are all potential buyers with productivity above RB, and active sellers are
all potential sellers with productivity below RS:
B = (1−GB′ (RB))B
′ = B′ (1− F (RB))
λ
λ+ γS
S = GS′ (RS)S
′ = S ′
λ
λ+ γB
F (RS) .
A.4 A Numerical Illustration
Unfortunately, the equilibrium conditions do not admit an explicit solution of the endogenous
variables (RS, RB, S, B) as a function of the exogenous parameters. Thus, in order to under-
stand how market thickness S ′ affects the equilibrium distribution of productivity and prices,
I fix values of the exogenous parameters and the exogenous distribution F (z) , and then solve
the model numerically.54 More precisely, the numerical solutions illustrate how moments of
the distributions of productivities and prices change as the thickness of the asset market S ′
increases, while holding the ratio of potential sellers (and, thus, assets) S ′ and potential buyers
B′ constant.
Figure 4 illustrates several features of the equilibrium. The behavior of the endogenous
variables (RS, RB) plotted in the first plot (first row, first column) is the key to understanding
the effects of market thickness on asset allocations and asset prices. The plot shows that sellers’
reservation value RS increases and buyers’ reservation value RB decreases as the number of
assets increases. This is intuitive: When the asset market is thin, trading frictions are high.
Thus, sellers rationally choose to hold on to assets with a thin market for longer periods of
time in case their productivity z rises in the future. As market thickness increases, frictions
vanish. Hence, the reservation values RS and RB converge, and their common limit is given
by the Walrasian benchmark R∗ that solves 1− F (R∗) = S
′
S′+B′
.55
The second plot (first row, second column) shows that the turnover of assets γBS
S′
increases
as the mass of assets increases. This is due to two reasons: 1) Sellers’ cutoff value is higher,
so the probability that assets are put on the market for sale is higher; and 2) the meeting rate
is higher, so conditional on being on the market, assets trade faster.
The plots in the second row document the effects of market thickness on capacity utiliza-
tion. The third plot (second row, first column) shows how the average capacity utilization
E (h) =
∫
h (z) gS′ (z) dz varies with the mass of assets. Moreover, since each agent chooses
the capacity utilization h to be equal to its productivity parameter z, the distribution gS′ (z)
reflects the efficiency of the allocation of assets. The plot clearly shows that average capacity
utilization and average productivity increase as the asset market becomes thicker. This sug-
54The numerical values of the exogenous parameters are: θ = .5; c = 150; r = .05; γ = .2; λ = .2; B′ = 1.5S′
and F (z) is the normal distribution with mean µ equal to 20 and standard deviation σ equal to 5.
55Given the numerical values assumed, the Walrasian limit R∗ of RS and RB is equal to 21.26.
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∫ ∫
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E
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E
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Fig. 4: Numerical solutions
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gests that, on average, assets are more efficiently allocated when their market becomes thicker.
The plot also shows that the average capacity utilization and productivity converge to the
Walrasian benchmark given by µ + σ
φ
(
R∗−µ
σ
)
1−Φ(R
∗
−µ
σ )
, where φ (·) and Φ (·) denote the standard
normal p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively.56 The fourth plot (second row, second column) shows
that the dispersion of capacity utilization E
∣∣∣h(z)−E(h)E(h) ∣∣∣—which is identical to the dispersion
of productivity E
∣∣∣z−E(z)E(z) ∣∣∣—decreases as asset markets become thicker.
The plots in the third row document the effects of market thickness on asset prices. The
fifth plot (third row, first column) of Figure 4 documents that the average asset price E (p) =∫ ∫
p (b, s) gS (s) gB (b) dsdb increases when the asset market becomes thicker. Moreover, the
price converges to the Walrasian price equal to pi(R
∗)
r
.57 The sixth plot (third row, second
column) shows that the dispersion of transaction prices E
∣∣∣p(b,s)−E(p)E(p) ∣∣∣decreases as the size of
the asset market increases.58
B Calibration
The goal of this Appendix is to calibrate the model to assess the magnitude of trading frictions.
To this end, I proceed in two steps: 1) I describe the additional assumptions that I need to
impose given the available data; and 2) I calibrate a slightly modified version of the model to
match moments of the data.
1. The model says that the profits that the asset generates are an increasing function of
the productivity of a carrier, and utilization is an increasing function of the productivity
of the carrier, as well. Thus, profits generated by an aircraft are an increasing function
of utilization, and the data confirm this necessary step (see footnote 18).
However, calculating the magnitude of trading frictions requires us to understand the
exact way in which aircraft utilization translates into aircraft prices—i.e., we need to
know the exact functional form that links utilization and profits. Important missing
pieces of information, for example, are the revenues and the costs generated by one hour
of utilization for each aircraft. This information is not readily available in the data.
Moreover, the separate identification of many parameters is problematic. Although the
model is highly non-linear, so that all parameters affect all outcomes, intuitively rev-
enues and costs parameters determine aircraft prices, and trading parameters determine
turnover rates. More precisely, revenues/profits π (h) and trading cost parameter c affect
one single outcome—i.e., aircraft prices. Thus, there is one equation in two unknown
56The numerical value of the Walrasian limit is equal to 24.83.
57The numerical value of the Walrasian limit is equal to 4522.7.
58I am reporting the quantities E
∣∣∣h(z)−E(h)E(h(z)) ∣∣∣ and E ∣∣∣ p(b,s)−E(p)E(p) ∣∣∣ to measure the dispersion of capacity
utilizations and prices, rather than the more common variances, because the empirical analysis is based on
these quantities E
∣∣∣h(z)−E(h)E(h) ∣∣∣ and E ∣∣∣ p(b,s)−E(p)E(p) ∣∣∣ . The variances of capacity utilizations and prices display
identical qualitative patterns—i.e., they decrease as the number of assets increases.
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parameters. Similarly, the parameters λ—the persistence of carriers’ profitability—and
γ—the rate of traders’ pairwise meetings—determine the turnover rate.
In addition, one additional important piece of information that determines turnover,
utilizations and prices is the ratio of buyers to sellers B
′
S′
. The paper keeps it constant,
and the qualitative results do not depend on how much larger B′ is than S ′. The ratio B
′
S′
determines the ratio of active buyers to active sellers B
S
, and B
S
determines the aggregate
number of transactions γBS and the individual trading rates. Potentially, I could recover
the magnitude of the ratio B
′
S′
if I knew how long it takes for a seller to sell an aircraft
and for a buyer to buy an aircraft. Unfortunately, as described in Section 4.3, the data
offer little indication of the magnitudes of these delays and, hence, no indication of what
the ratio B
′
S′
is. Thus, the Poisson rate γ and the ratio B
′
S′
cannot be separately identified.
2. With the previous caveats in mind, I proceed by fixing some parameters, and by imposing
some assumptions on the functional form that links utilization and profits. Then, I use
the model to infer the magnitudes of transaction costs by calibrating the key parameters
to match some moments of the data.
Specifically, I fix the bargaining power to θ = .5 and the interest rate r = .05. It is
well known that the bargaining power and the discount factor/interest rate are difficult
parameters to calibrate in the data. In addition, I fix γ = .1, B
′
S′
= 1.5, and c = 500, 000.
Moreover, I assume that the profit function takes the following form:
π (h) = αh,
where α is a parameter to be calibrated. The above expression arises, for example, if
the profit function is
π (z) = max
h
α
(
zh1/2 − h
)
so that the optimal h =
(
z
2
)2
and π (z) = α
(
z
2
)2
= αh. I further assume that F (z) is
normal with mean µ and standard deviation σ to be calibrated.
Further, I select the more popular aircraft type—the Boeing 737—to reduce the hetero-
geneity across aircraft types, and compute some moments from the data. More precisely,
I take the average number of Boeing 737s during the period 1990-2002—equal to 2,700
units—and calculate the corresponding average flying hours, the standard deviations of
flying hours, the average price from the “Blue Book” dataset, and the average turnover
of Boeing 737s (I am not using any moment on the dispersion of transaction prices
since the sample of transaction prices refer to earlier years.) Then, I take a ten-percent
increase in the number of Boeing 737s, and apply the elasticities estimated in Tables
4 and 6 to the average flying hours and average price. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel
A-Table B1 report the exact numeric value of the moments.
Then, I then calibrate the parameters (α, λ, µ, σ) so that the moments computed from
the model are as close as possible to the moments in the data, as reported in Table B1.
Panel B of Table B1 reports the implied parameters, and columns (3) and (4) of Panel
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Table B1: Moments and Parameters of the Calibration
Panel A: Moments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data Data Model Model
Number of Aircraft (Airtype) 2700 3000 2700 3000
Average Flying Hours E (h) 2724 2780 2751 2752
Standard Deviation of Flying Hours 239 239
Average Price ($1,000) 32, 950 33, 930 33, 433 33, 445
Turnover .11 .12 .114 .115
Panel B: Parameters
γ 0.05
B′
S′
1.5
c 500, 000
α 672.63
λ 0.217
µ 98.24
σ 7.17
Notes—This table contains details of the calibration of model parameters. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A
report the moments of the data that the model seeks to match. Columns (3) and (4) in Panel A report the
corresponding moments computed from the model with the parameters reported in Panel B.
A report the moments computed from the model at those parameters.
Overall, the model matches the data moderately well. Moreover, the magnitudes of
parameters seem reasonable. The parameter λ implies that the productivity of a carrier
varies, on average, every five years (≈ 1/λ) . The parameter α means that one flying
hour translates into approximately $672 of profits. More interestingly, the Poisson rate
γ of the trading technology—fixed at .05—along with the endogenous mass of buyers
implies that the individual rate of selling (buying) an aircraft is equal to γB ≈ 3.98
(γS ≈ 3.87) , so that it takes approximately 12
γB
≈ 3 months to sell a Boeing 737 when
the size of the market is 2,700 units. Since the annual search cost parameter c is fixed
to $500,000 and it takes approximately three months to sell a Boeing 737, the total
transaction costs are equal to approximately c
γB
≈ $125, 000 (in year-2000 values), or
c
γB
αE(h)
≈ 6.7 percent of the annual flow of profits from operating the aircraft.
As mentioned, these parameters and the implied transaction costs rely on several as-
sumptions. Unfortunately, some of these assumptions are not directly testable with the
available data. For these reasons, I view these parameters as suggestive. Moreover, the
magnitudes that these parameters imply do not seem unreasonable, and they conform
fairly well with some estimates reported in industry publications (Airfinance Journal,
several issues)
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